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My dissertation uses game theoretical and experimental approaches to study how individuals
behavior in di¤erent informational environments a¤ects economic outcomes and motivations
for charitable giving. Chapter 2 Bargaining with Uncertain Value Distributions studies
a bargaining model in which the seller is uncertain not only about the buyers value but
also about which distribution the buyers values are drawn from. Di¤erent from the classi-
cal models, the distribution of the buyers values is xed across periods, while the buyers
values are drawn independently from the distribution each period. I nd that adding this
additional layer of uncertainty improves the sellers prot when her ex ante beliefs are su¢ -
ciently optimistic. Chapter 3, Social Norms, Information, and Trust among Strangers: An
Experimental Study (with John Du¤y and Yong-Ju Lee), investigates whether norms of
trust and reciprocity arise in response to di¤erent reputational mechanisms. We conduct an
experiment where anonymous subjects are randomly matched each period and play a series
of indenitely repeated trust games. We nd that the social norm of trust and reciprocity is
di¢ cult to sustain without reputational information, although it is supported as an equilib-
rium by the parameters. The provision of information on playerspast decisions signicantly
increases trust and reciprocity. Furthermore, making such information available at a small
cost also leads to a signicant improvement, despite that most subjects do not choose to
purchase this information. Finally, Chapter 4 Motives for Charitable Giving (with Lise
Vesterlund and Mark Wilhelm) reports an experiment which tests the pure altruistic and
the impure altruistic explanations for charitable giving. We focus on the comparative sta-
tic predictions of both models and quantify the relative weight attached to the warm-glow
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component of giving in the impure altruism model. A methodological innovation is to create
the equivalent of a series of real-world charities. Each participant is paired with a child who
has su¤ered a severe re and informed that they single-handedly determine the size of a gift
given to the child. Our results show that participants behave as predicted by the impure
altruism model. However the relative weight attached to the warm-glow of giving is very
small.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Microeconomics studies individuals behavior under di¤erent economic circumstances. Using
both game theoretical and experimental approaches, this dissertation in particular contribute
to two topics: individualsstrategic behavior with response to the information environment
and motives for altruistic behavior such as trust and charitable giving.
The rst chapter, Bargaining under Uncertain Value Distributions,studies a bargaining
procedure where a durable-good monopolist o¤ers a price to rent a durable good to a buyer
repeatedly in multiple periods. The buyer is assumed to have private information. Since
bargaining proceeds between the two parties repeatedly, the players have the consideration
that information revealed in early periods may a¤ect the bargaining outcome in later periods
and take this into account from the beginning of the game. I ask how the buyers private
information is revealed or concealed over time and how it a¤ects the distribution of economic
surpluses between the two parties.
In the classical models, it is usually assumed that the distribution of the buyers value
is common knowledge, only the buyers value is private information, and the buyers value
is xed across periods. In this framework, a stark and established result is that the seller
has a large disadvantage and loses most of her monopoly power. The literature on Coase
conjecture nds that if the durable-good monopolist sells over time and can quickly lower
prices, the seller can hardly achieve prots greater than the lowest buyer valuation and the
buyer obtains the entire surplus from trade in excess of his lowest valuation (Coase 1972,
Fudenberg et al. 1985). When the monopolist rents the durable, Hart and Tirole (1988)
show that the seller always o¤ers a low price until the end of the game if the horizon is long
enough.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the seller can improve her prot in
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a rental model when there is an additional layer of uncertainty about the distribution of
the buyers value. It is assumed that the buyer has private information not only about
his value in each period but also about the distribution which his values are drawn from.
The distribution of the buyers values is xed across periods, while the buyers values are
assumed to be drawn from the distribution independently in each period. This information
structure characterizes a situation where the buyer has one-sided private information about
his long-term preference but also has some uncertainty about the short-term values in the
future.
The main result of the paper is that the seller is indeed better o¤when she has su¢ ciently
optimistic ex ante beliefs of the favorable distribution, compared to the model of Hart and
Tirole (1988). Intuitively, given that the sellers prior belief is large and there is uncertainty
on the buyers value distribution, the sellers posterior belief does not change critically and
she o¤ers a same price in the second no matter whether the rst o¤er is accepted or rejected
by the buyer. Thus the buyer with a high value in the rst period is more willing to accept
a high price, and this gives the seller a leeway to improve her prot.
In the second chapter Social Norms, Information, and Trust among Strangers: An
Experimental Study, we examine how the social norms of trust and reciprocity emerge
among a population of anonymous strangers who do not meet each other frequently. For
instance, why the online market with essentially anonymous buyers and sellers functions
e¢ ciently? Why the credit card companies lend money to customers without credit history?
Why restaurants in vacation areas may also provide good services to tourists who never come
back?
We rst examine the hypothesis that trust might be attached to a society as a whole;
the fear of the destruction of that trust might su¢ ce to enforce trustworthy behavior by all
members of the society as shown by Kandori (1992). On the other hand, such a mechanism
might be too fragile and so we examine the second possibility that trustworthiness resides
at the individual rather than the societal level. In particular, we ask whether the provision
of information on individual reputations for trustworthiness engenders greater trust than in
the case where such information is absent. We further explore whether the free provision
of reputational information is responsible for our ndings or whether the availability of
2
acquiring such information (at a small cost) su¢ ces to sustain greater trust and reciprocity.
We nd that, although the social norm of trust and reciprocity is theoretically sustained
as a sequential equilibrium without any reputational information, there is very little trust
and reciprocity found in this case in the experiment. Providing information on the trustees
previous behavior improves matters. When the amount of information about trustees is in-
creased, it leads to more signicant increases in trust and reciprocity relative to the absence
of such information. Finally, when investors must decide whether to purchase the infor-
mation concerning their current matched trustee, we nd that on average, only one-fourth
of investors choose to purchase this information, so that the other three-fourths are in the
dark about the prior behavior of their current trustee. Nevertheless, trust and reciprocity
is signicantly higher in this costly information treatment as compared with the baseline
no-information treatment.
In the third chapter Motives for Charitable Giving,we present an experimental study
on why people contribute to charities. Economic theory on charitable giving distinguishes
between the pure and impure altruism model. The pure altruism model argues that the sole
motive for giving is a concern for securing the charitys output, whereas the impure altruism
model allows for the possibility that a donor also get a warm glow from being the one who
secures the contribution to the charity. The literature on motives for giving has traditionally
taken the pure altruism model as the null hypothesis, and interpreted rejections as evidence
in favor of impure altruism.
In contrast to previous studies we test the comparative static predictions of both the pure
and impure altruism model, and account for the possibility that consistent with the impure
altruism model the support for pure altruism may be sensitive to the point at which the
motive for giving is evaluated. In particular in the impure altruism model increases in the
contribution of others will shift the marginal motive for giving from a concern for altruism to
a concern for the private benet from giving. From a methodological viewpoint we develop an
environment that closely mirrors those of the theoretical models. We examine contributions
to an actual charity where each participant is informed of an initial contribution amount
and singlehandedly determines the nal dollar amount to be transferred to a recipient of the
charity.
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In examining charitable contributions across several budgets, we consistently nd behav-
ior in line with the comparative static predictions of the impure altruism model. However
our data also make clear that a substantial weight is attached to the altruistic component
of preferences. When estimating a representative utility function we nd, consistent with
our comparative static results, that participants get a private benet from giving, however
it accounts for but a fraction of the weight attached to the public benet associated with
providing funds for the charitys recipient. Thus we demonstrate that there are environments
for which it would be incorrect to assume that donors charitable contributions primarily are
made because of the private benet one may experience from giving.
4
2.0 BARGAINING WITH UNCERTAIN VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we analyze a two-period bargaining model in which a durable-good monopolist
rents the durable good to a buyer in each period.1 The buyer has private information about
his values realized in the current and previous periods and the distribution which his values
are drawn from, but is uncertain about his future values. The distribution of the buyers
values is assumed xed across periods, while the buyers values are assumed to be drawn
from the distribution independently in each period. As early revelation of the buyers private
information a¤ects future outcomes when the players interact repeatedly, we focus on the
question of how information is revealed over time. Related to that, we examine how economic
surplus is distributed between the buyer and the seller. In the classical models, it is usually
assumed that the distribution of the buyers value is common knowledge, only the buyers
value is private information, and the buyers value is xed across periods. In this framework,
a stark and established result is that the seller has a large disadvantage and loses most of
her monopoly power, since the high-value buyer has a large incentive to conceal his value
given that his value is xed and bargaining proceeds in multiple periods. This paper asks
whether the sellers standing may be improved by introducing a layer of uncertainty about
the distribution of the buyers values and allowing the buyers values to randomly change
each period.
The literature on Coase conjecture nds that if the durable-good monopolist sells over
time and can quickly lower prices, the seller can hardly achieve prots greater than the
lowest buyer valuation and the buyer obtains the entire surplus from trade in excess of his
1We will use she to denote the seller and he to denote the buyer.
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lowest valuation (Coase 1972, Fudenberg et al. 1985).2 The intuition is that the monopolist is
induced to reduce the price when facing the residual demand after having sold some quantity
to high-value buyers, and rationally anticipating falling prices causes most potential buyers
to wait for a lower price in the future.
The Coase conjecture, however, may fail to hold if we relax the assumption that the
buyers valuation is xed across periods.3 Sobel (1991) shows that when there is a constant
ow of new buyers, a Folk theorem holds, that is, any positive average prot less than the
maximum feasible level can be attained. Blume (1990) examines a bargaining model where
the low buyer types value varies over time and the high buyer types value stays xed, and
demonstrates that both uniqueness and Coase conjecture may fail to hold when valuations
are allowed to vary randomly.
Another approach that tries to ameliorate the sellers position in the Coase conjecture is
to allow the seller to rent the durable good instead of selling it. Bulow (1982) argues that
the durable-good monopolist may be better o¤ if she chooses to rent the durable good rather
than sell it, however, he assumes that the buyer is anonymous, that is, the seller cannot
identify the buyer nor his past behavior.
When the monopolist bargains over renting the durable good to a non-anonymous buyer
with private value, Hart and Tirole (1988) show that the seller always o¤ers a low price
until the end of the game given any prior belief, if the horizon is long enough. Intuitively,
when the time horizon is long, the high-value buyer will not accept any price rejected by the
low-value buyer, in order to avoid being charged with a high price in all the later periods. So
the seller is not able to price discriminate and she charges a low price to both the low-value
and high-value buyer, until close to the end of the horizon. Therefore, if the durable-good
monopolist rents the durable good to a non-anonymous buyer, the seller is again caught in
an unfavorable position. Furthermore, Hart and Tirole (1988) show that renting is even no
better than selling, and it is strictly worse if the horizon is long enough.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether the seller can improve her prot
2This result only holds under the assumption that the sellers marginal cost is lower than the buyers
lowest value, which is called the gapcase in the literature.
3Failures of the Coase conjecture are also found when the lowest buyer valuation does not exceed the
sellers cost, which is referred as the no-gapcase in the literature (Gul et al. 1986, Ausubel and Deneckere
1989). Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) prove a Folk theorem similar to Sobel (1991).
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in a rental model with a non-anonymous buyer if the buyers value is allowed to change each
period. It is not clear how much Hart and Tiroles (1988) result depends on the assumption
that the buyers value is xed across periods. Intuitively, when the buyers value is invariant
over time, the high-value buyer reveals all the information about his future values once he
takes an action di¤erent from the low-value buyer. On the contrary, if there always remains
some degree of uncertainty about the buyers future values, a buyer whose current value is
revealed to be high does not necessarily have a high value in later periods. Therefore, he
may be more willing to reveal his current value and realize a positive payo¤ in early periods
without losing all potential future surplus. Thus, the uncertainty of the buyers future values
may provide an additional leeway to solve the problem of the durable-good monopolist.
In the paper we introduce an additional layer of uncertainty about the distribution of the
buyers value. The distribution of the buyers value may be either favorable or unfavorable,
with the favorable distribution generating a high value with a higher probability. At the
beginning of the game, the buyer privately observes the distribution. At the beginning of
each period, the buyers value is randomly drawn from the distribution. Our information
structure and the assumption of uncertain value distributions characterize a situation where
the buyer has one-sided private information about his long-term preference but also has some
uncertainty about the short-term values in the future.
The assumption that the buyers value distribution is uncertain can be illustrated in the
following examples. Imagine that the buyer rents an apartment in a city from the landlord
(seller) in multiple periods. The buyer is not completely sure about his value in future
periods since it may depend on how much time he will spend in the city. So it is reasonable
to assume that the buyers value of renting the apartment in each period is drawn from a
distribution. The buyers value distribution, however, is decided by some private information
of the buyer, for instance, whether the buyers family lives close to the city. If the buyers
family lives close to the city, the buyer may spend more time in the city, and the value
distribution generates a high value with a higher probability.
Another example is that an intermediate producer repeatedly rents a durable good from
a monopolist, for example, a construction company rents big equipments every time when
a new project begins. The producers value of consuming the durable good in each period
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depends on the quality of his nal products in that period. The quality of the producers
nal products depends on both the producers technology and some random e¤ects. The
producer may have a superior technology or an inferior technology, and the probability of
generating a good nal product is higher with a superior technology. Both the technology
and the quality of the nal products are private information of the producer.
The main result we nd is that the seller is indeed better o¤ when she has su¢ ciently
optimistic ex ante beliefs of the favorable distribution, compared to the model of Hart and
Tirole (1988) with the same ex ante probability of high-value buyer. The unique equilibrium
outcome is for the seller to o¤er a high price and for the buyer with a high value to accept the
o¤er in each period.4 Intuitively, if the seller always o¤ers a high price in the second period
no matter whether the rst-period o¤er is accepted or rejected, the buyer has no incentive
to play strategically in the rst period and will simply adopt a strategy of truth-telling, i.e.,
accepting the o¤er if and only if it is less than or equal to his value. Thus, buyer types
who have the same value but draw from di¤erent distributions will behave the same. Given
that the favorable distribution has a higher probability of drawing a high value, the seller
becomes more optimistic after acceptance and more pessimistic after rejection. However,
since the sellers ex ante belief of the favorable distribution is su¢ ciently optimistic, the
sellers posterior beliefs after both acceptance and rejection will still be optimistic enough
for her to o¤er a high price in the second period.
The equilibrium outcome described above, however, cannot hold when the seller has
moderate ex ante beliefs. In this case, all the buyer types still truthfully reject any o¤er
greater than their value. But the high-value buyer from the favorable distribution strategi-
cally randomizes to reject a range of prices less than but close to the high value, in order to
conceal information about his type. For the low-value types, multiple equilibrium strategies
are found for a range of prices less than but close to the low value. It is an equilibrium
strategy for both low-value types to accept the o¤er or to reject the o¤er, or for the low-
value buyer from the unfavorable distribution to randomize and the low-value buyer from
the favorable distribution to reject the o¤er. When the seller has moderate ex ante beliefs,
4The equilibria in this paper refer to those that survive a renement which is a variant of the D1 criterion
in signaling games (Cho and Kreps 1987, Banks and Sobel 1987). We discuss the equilibrium concept in
more detail in section 2 and Appendix A.
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the buyer is found more strategic since it is easier to a¤ect the sellers posterior belief. The
sellers revenue, however, can still be higher than that in Hart and Tirole (1988) in this case.
Su¢ cient conditions for the seller to be better o¤ are provided.
Two other papers also examine a rental model in which a non-anonymous buyers value
randomly changes over time.5 Kennan (2001) analyzes innitely repeated contract negotia-
tions where the buyer has persistent (but not permanent) private information. The buyers
value is assumed to change according to a two-state Markov chain. Kennan (2001) focuses
on the cyclic screening equilibria in which several pooling o¤ers in sequence make the seller
more and more optimistic and the seller makes an aggressive screening o¤er eventually.
The paper closest to our study is Loginova and Taylor (2007). They investigate a two-
period model where the monopolist employs price experimentations to learn the permanent
demand parameter of the buyer. Although we have beneted a lot from reading their paper,
the two papers were developed independently and di¤er signicantly in the modeling and
results.
First, we assume that the value distribution may either be favorable or unfavorable, with
the favorable distribution generating a high value with a higher probability. Loginova and
Taylor (2007) assume that the value distribution is represented by , which is a continuous
random variable distributed on [0; 1], and a distribution represented by  generates a high
value with probability  and a low value with probability 1  . We keep our model simpler
so that we can completely characterize the equilibria and compare the sellers revenue with
that in Hart and Tirole (1988).
Second, Loginova and Taylor (2007) assume that there is no discounting, while the dis-
count rate is between 0 and 1 in our model. This di¤erence has several e¤ects on the results.
First, Loginova and Taylor (2007) show that the buyer has a unique equilibrium strategy
when the rst-period o¤er is greater than the low value, by assuming the continuity of  and
no discounting. We achieve the same result after renement. Multiple equilibrium strate-
gies, however, reappear in Loginova and Taylor (2007) if discounting is introduced into the
model. Second, similar to our results when the seller has a moderate prior, Loginova and
5Several other papers also allow the buyers valuations to vary over time. Blume (1998) and Battaglini
(2005) study long-term contracting. Biehl (2001) analyzes a durable-goods model with anonymous buyers.
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Taylor (2007) nd multiple equilibrium strategies for the low-value types when the rst-
period o¤er is less than but close to the low value. They focus on two equilibria: the Good
Equilibrium and the Bad Equilibrium. In the Good Equilibrium, all the low-value types
accept the o¤er. In the Bad Equilibrium, a low-value buyer with high  strategically re-
jects the o¤er. The main nding in the Good Equilibrium is that the seller never o¤ers a
rst-period price that yields her valuable information about the buyers permanent demand
parament . In our model, the seller o¤ers a price that yields valuable information in the
Good Equilibrium, if the discount rate is low enough or the sellers prior is high enough.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 presents players equilibrium strategies in the second period. We discuss some
preliminary results in Section 4. Section 5 presents the set of equilibria. Section 6 compares
the sellers revenue in this model with that in Hart and Tirole (1988). Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A provides a detailed discussion about equilibrium concept. All the proofs are in
Appendix B.
2.2 THE MODEL
One seller and one buyer bargain over renting a durable good in two periods t = 1; 2. The
sellers cost is assumed to be 0. The buyer has private information about both his value
in each period t, vt, and the distribution which his values are drawn from. The buyers
distribution d can be the F distribution or the G distribution. The buyers value vt equals
h with probability qd and equals l with probability 1   qd for a given d. Assume that
0 < qF < qG < 1 and 0 < l < h. The G distribution is more favorable since it has a higher
probability of generating a value h. The ex ante probability is  for the G distribution and
1   for the F distribution.
At the beginning of the game, the buyer privately observes the realization of distribution
d, which is xed throughout the game. At the beginning of each period t, the buyers
valuation vt is drawn from the realized distribution d independently across time periods.
After the buyer privately observes vt, the seller o¤ers a price pt 2 R, and then the buyer
chooses an action at 2 f0; 1g, where at = 1 means acceptance and at = 0 means rejection.
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Both the seller and the buyer are assumed to be risk-neutral. If the buyer accepts the
sellers o¤er in period t, the buyers payo¤ is vt   pt and the sellers payo¤ is pt in period t.
They both gain nothing in period t if pt is rejected. The two players share a common discount
factor , and both of them maximize the discounted present value of expected payo¤s. All
of the information above is common knowledge.
1 = (d; v1) is referred as the buyers type in period 1 and 2 = (d; v1; v2) as the buyers
type in period 2. Since we focus on the buyers behavior in period 1, it is helpful to notice
that in period 1 there are four buyer types: (G; l), (F; l), (G; h), and (F; h). Denote hSt as
the history observed by the seller before she announces pt and hBt as the history observed
by the buyer before he chooses at. Specically, hS1 = ?, hB1 = (1; p1), hS2 = (p1; a1) and
hB2 = (2; p1; a1; p2). A behavioral strategy for the seller, 
S, assigns probability (or density)
S(pt j hSt ) to pt given any history hSt for t = 1; 2. A behavioral strategy for the buyer, B,
assigns probability B(at j hBt ) to at given any history hBt for t = 1; 2. For convenience, let
B(hBt )  B(at = 1 j hBt ) denote the probability that the buyer accepts pt given history hBt ,
since the buyer can only choose to accept or reject an o¤er.
Let (hSt ) denote the probability that the sellers belief assigns to the G distribution at
the beginning of period t given history hSt . The sellers ex ante belief of the G distribution
is . Based on , the seller forms her ex ante beliefs over the buyers type 1. After o¤ering
p1 and observing a1, the seller updates her belief of 1, using Bayesrule whenever possible.
Then the sellers posterior belief of the G distribution is formed based on her posterior belief
of 1. Notice that (p1; 0) and (p1; 1) denote the sellers belief of d = G given that p1 is
rejected and accepted respectively.
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is strong Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Bayes
rule is used to update the sellers belief conditional on reaching any price p1, even if p1 is o¤
the equilibrium path. We also employ a renement which is a variant of criterion D1 in the
signalling game (Cho and Kreps 1987, Banks and Sobel 1987). In Appendix A, we formally
dene criterion D1 and give an example on how criterion D1 can help select an equilibrium.
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2.3 THE SECOND-PERIOD EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
We start the analysis from the second period. Since it is the last period, the buyer accepts
p2 if and only if p2 does not exceed v2.6 Then the optimal p2 for the seller is either l or
h. The seller o¤ers p2 = l if her posterior belief of v2 = h is less than the cuto¤ belief l=h
and o¤ers p2 = h if it is greater than l=h. Notice that the seller always o¤ers p2 = h if the
probability of drawing a high value from the F distribution, qF , is greater than l=h, and the
seller always o¤ers p2 = l if the probability of drawing a high value from the G distribution,
qG, is smaller than l=h, regardless of history hS2 . To make the problem more interesting,
we assume qF < l=h < qG in this paper. Since the sellers posterior belief of v2 = h is
qG + qF (1  ) if her posterior belief of d = G is , the seller o¤ers p2 = l if her posterior
belief of the G distribution is less than  and o¤ers p2 = h if her posterior belief of the
G distribution is greater than , where  satises the equation qG + qF (1   ) = l=h.
Since the seller either o¤ers p2 = l or p2 = h in period 2, let x(hS2 ) denote the probability
that p2 = l and 1   x(hS2 ) denote the probability that p2 = h after history hS2 . Lemma 1
formally states the discussion above.
Lemma 1. In any PBE, the buyers strategy in the second period is
B(hB2 ) =
8<: 1;0; if p2  v2;if p2 > v2;
and the sellers strategy in the second period is
x(hS2 ) =
8>>><>>>:
1; if (hS2 ) < 
;
0; if (hS2 ) > 
;
2 [0; 1]; if (hS2 ) = ;
where  = (l=h  qF )=(qG   qF ).
6As noted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), the buyer is indi¤erent between acceptance and rejection if
p2 = v2, but on the equilibrium path the buyer accepts p2 = v2 with probability one.
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2.4 PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section we rst present two preliminary results that provide us the intuition of equi-
libria. Roughly speaking, the rst observation is that no separation between one buyer type
and the other three types is possible in equilibrium. Second, the seller is more pessimistic
after rejection of a rst-period o¤er rather than after acceptance of the o¤er.
We start with dening the cuto¤ value for each buyer type, which the buyer type is
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. From the playersequilibrium strategies in the
second period, the buyers expected payo¤ from accepting p1 is v1   p1 + qdx(p1; 1)(h  l),
where v1   p1 is the buyers gain in the rst period from accepting p1, and qdx(p1; 1) is
the product of the probability for the buyer type to draw an h value in period 2 and the
probability for the seller to o¤er p2 = l after acceptance of p1. Correspondingly, the buyers
expected payo¤ from rejecting p1 is qdx(p1; 0)(h   l), where x(p1; 0) is the probability for
the seller to o¤er p2 = l after rejection of p1. By comparing the payo¤s from accepting
and rejecting p1, the buyer type (d; v1) accepts p1 with probability one if p1 is smaller than
v1 + q
d[x(p1; 1)   x(p1; 0)](h   l) and rejects p1 with probability one if it is greater than
v1 + q
d[x(p1; 1)  x(p1; 0)](h  l). Therefore, the buyers cuto¤ value is dened as follows.
Denition 1. Denote C(d; v1)  v1 + qd[x(p1; 1)  x(p1; 0)](h  l) as the Cuto¤ Value for
buyer type 1 = (d; v1) given x(p1; 0) and x(p1; 1).
Lemma 2. In any PBE, the probability for buyer type 1 = (d; v1) to accept p1 is
B(1; p1) =
8>>><>>>:
1;
0;
2 [0; 1];
if p1 < C(d; v1);
if p1 > C(d; v1);
if p1 = C(d; v1):
By denition the buyers cuto¤value depends not only on his type but also on the sellers
second-period strategy. Figure 2.1 below describes how the order of all buyer typescuto¤
values depends on the sellers strategies in the second period.
From Figure 2.1 we can see how the two elements of the buyers type v1 and d, along
with the sellers second-period strategy, a¤ect the buyers behavior. First, the buyer types
with v1 = l always have a smaller cuto¤ value than types with v1 = h. This is robust with
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If
l hC(G,h) C(F,h)C(F,l)C(G,l)
C(F,l)=C(G,l)=l C(F,h)=C(G,h)=h
l hC(F,l) C(G,l) C(F,h) C(G,h)
If
P1
P1
P1
x(P1,0) > x(P1,1)
x(P1,0) = x(P1,1)
x(P1,0) < x(P1,1)
Figure 2.1: The Order of Cuto¤ Values
the sellers strategy in the second period. Loosely speaking, a low-value type is more likely
to reject an o¤er than a high-value type, no matter which distribution their values are drawn
from.
Second, the e¤ect of the distribution d on the order of cuto¤ values depends on the
sellers strategy in the second period. If the seller o¤ers p2 = l with a larger probability
when p1 is rejected than accepted (i.e., x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1)), then the cuto¤ value for buyer
type (d; v1) is smaller than his value v1. The intuition is that, since the potential payo¤
in the second period is larger after rejection than acceptance of p1, the buyer is willing to
o¤set some current benet and reject an o¤er less than his current value in order to gain
a larger payo¤ in the future. Furthermore, the cuto¤ value of buyer type (G; v1) is smaller
than the cuto¤ value of buyer type (F; v1), since buyer type (G; v1) has a larger probability
of drawing an h value in period 2 and therefore has a larger potential payo¤ after rejection
of p1. On the contrary, if the seller o¤ers p2 = l with a larger probability when p1 is accepted
than rejected (i.e., x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1)), the cuto¤ value for buyer type (d; v1) is greater than
his value v1, and the cuto¤ value of buyer type (G; v1) is greater than that of buyer type
(F; v1). The intuition is similar to the last point. Since acceptance of p1 gives the buyer
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a potentially larger payo¤ in the second period than rejection of p1, the buyer is willing to
incur a loss and accept p1 which exceeds his value v1. Finally, if the seller o¤ers p2 = l with
the same probability when p1 is rejected and accepted, then the distribution d does not have
any e¤ect on the buyers rst-period behavior, and the buyers cuto¤ value coincides with
his value v1, thus the buyer truthfully reveals his value in the rst period.
Next we discuss the two observations mentioned before.
Observation 1: No separation between one buyer type and the other three types is possible
in equilibrium.
The key point of Observation 1 is that the seller cannot separate one buyer type from
the others if she o¤ers p2 = l with a di¤erent probability after acceptance and rejection of p1
in equilibrium. Intuitively, the seller o¤ers p2 = l with a larger probability after one action
than the other only when she is more pessimistic after the rst action, however, since the
buyer types from the G distribution have a larger incentive to take the action that makes
the seller more pessimistic, the seller then becomes more optimistic if that action is taken
by a single type from the G distribution. So it easily reaches a contradiction.
It is intuitive to see this from Figure 2.1. Suppose the seller o¤ers x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). The
seller can separate one buyer type from the other three types if p1 is rejected only by type
(G; l) (following which the seller should o¤er x(p1; 0) = 0), or p1 is accepted only by type
(F; h) (following which the seller should o¤er x(p1; 1) = 1). Both cases contradict with the
assumption x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). It is easy to verify that the similar contradiction is reached
when the seller o¤ers x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1).
The remaining case is that the seller o¤ers p2 = l with the same probability after accep-
tance and rejection of p1 (i.e., x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1)). Figure 2.1 shows that two buyer types
with the same v1 behave similarly: both accept p1 less than their value v1 and reject p1
greater than v1. Therefore, the seller cannot distinguish the buyer types who have the same
v1 but draw from di¤erent distributions.
From the discussion above, the seller cannot separate one buyer type from the other three
given any second-period strategy of the seller. Observation 1 have two important and related
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implications. First, the seller is not able to identify the buyers distribution in equilibrium.
Second, the screening between two buyer types with v1 = l and two buyer types with v1 = h
is an important feature of equilibria.
Observation 2: The seller is more pessimistic after rejection of p1 than acceptance of p1.
The intuition for Observation 2 is as follows. Suppose that the seller is more optimistic
after rejection of p1 and o¤ers x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1) in the second period. From Observation
1, no p1 separates one buyer type from the other three in equilibrium. Suppose then p1
separates two buyer types with v1 = l from the types with v1 = h. From Figure 2.1 it must
be the case that the buyer types with v1 = l reject the o¤er and the buyer types with v1 = h
accept the o¤er. Then the seller must be more pessimistic after rejection than acceptance of
p1, given that the G distribution has a higher probability of drawing an h value. The seller
then should o¤er x(p1; 0)  x(p1; 1), which reaches a contradiction.
Let 	(p1; a1) denote the probability that action a1 is taken in the continuation game
following p1. Observation 2 can be expressed more formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) for a given p1 in a PBE, then x(p1; 0)  x(p1; 1).
As a summary, the preliminary results in this section imply that the seller cannot separate
one buyer type from the other three types in equilibrium. Related to that, nor can the seller
learn perfectly the buyers distribution. However, the seller updates her belief about the
buyers distribution, when she separates buyer types with v1 = l and buyer types with
v1 = h. Finally, the seller is always more pessimistic when p1 is rejected than accepted, if
both acceptance and rejection of p1 occur with a positive probability in the continuation
game following p1. A more rigorous description of Observation 1 can be found in Lemma 16
and Lemma 17, which are delegated to Appendix B.
2.5 THE EQUILIBRIA
In this section we present the equilibria of the game. The equilibrium outcome and players
strategy are found to greatly depend on the sellers ex ante beliefs. So we rst divide the
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sellers ex ante beliefs into di¤erent ranges and then discuss the set of equilibria correspond-
ingly. When the equilibrium price in the rst period is accepted by all buyer types, we call
the equilibrium pooling. When the rst-period o¤er is accepted and rejected by more than
one buyer type, we call the equilibrium semi-separating.
The results in the last section suggest that, the seller cannot separate one buyer type
from the other three types, but it is more likely for the seller to distinguish buyer types with
v1 = l and buyer types with v1 = h. So we classify the sellers ex ante beliefs according to
whether the sellers posterior beliefs conditional on v1 = l and v1 = h are greater than or
less than the cuto¤ belief .
Since the favorable distribution G has a larger probability of generating a high value,
the sellers posterior belief conditional on v1 = l is lower than her ex ante belief and her
posterior belief conditional on v1 = h is higher than her ex ante belief. Furthermore, since
the F distribution and the G distribution have the same support, the sellers posterior beliefs
conditional on v1 = l or v1 = h are always between 0 and 1. Recall that whether the seller
o¤ers the low price or the high price in the second period depends on whether her posterior
belief is greater or smaller than the cuto¤belief . Therefore, when the sellers ex ante belief
is small enough, her posterior belief is smaller than the cuto¤ belief  even conditional on
v1 = h. On the contrary, when the sellers ex ante belief is large enough, her posterior belief
can be greater than the cuto¤belief conditional v1 = l. Only when the seller has moderate ex
ante beliefs, her posterior belief is above  conditional on v1 = h and below  conditional
on v1 = l. The following equations and graph give us a more clear illustration.
Dene functions
()  q
G
qG + (1  )qF ;
and
()  (1  q
G)
(1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF ) :
Dene e   1() and b   1().7 () and () are the sellers posterior beliefs of the
G distribution conditional on v1 = h and v1 = l respectively.
7Both () and () are continuous and increasing in ; () <  < () for  2 (0; 1); () = () = 
for  2 f0; 1g. So e and b are well-dened and e <  < b.
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Figure 2.2: Seller with Di¤erent Prior Beliefs
In Figure 2.2, the x axis is the sellers ex ante belief . The 450 line represents the sellers
belief when she has no more information than at the beginning of the game. () and ()
are generated with qF = 0:4, qG = 0:8, and l=h = 0:6. The curve () is above the 450
line since the sellers belief conditional on v1 = h is larger than her ex ante belief. On the
contrary, the seller becomes more pessimistic conditional on v1 = l relative to her ex ante
belief, i.e., the curve () is below the 450 line. Furthermore, when the sellers ex ante belief
is smaller than e (greater than b), her posterior beliefs conditional on v1 = h and v1 = l are
both below (above) . When the sellers ex ante belief is between e and b, her posterior
belief conditional on v1 = h is above  and her belief conditional on v1 = l is below .
According to the sellers ex ante belief of the G distribution, we dene a seller Pessimistic
if 0 <  < e, Moderately Pessimistic if e <  < , Moderately Optimistic if  <  < b,
and Optimistic if b <  < 1. As in the previous literature, the knife-edge cases are omitted
in this paper.
In Lemma 3 we have shown that the seller o¤ers p2 = l after rejection of p1 with a
probability at least as large as after acceptance of p1, if p1 is both accepted and rejected
with a positive probability in the continuation game. The following lemma states more
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specically that the seller o¤ers p2 = l with a strictly larger probability after rejection of p1
than acceptance of p1 only if the seller has a moderate ex ante belief. With an extreme ex
ante belief, the seller o¤ers p2 = l with the same probability after rejection and acceptance of
p1. These results hold when both acceptance and rejection of p1 are reached with a positive
probability in the continuation game.
Lemma 4. If 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) for a given p1 in a PBE, then
(i) x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1))  2 [e; b];
(ii)  2 (0; e) [ (b; 1)) x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1).
2.5.1 Seller with Extreme Ex Ante Beliefs
When the seller has a pessimistic or an optimistic belief, the buyers strategy is to truthfully
reveal his value in both periods: accept an o¤er no greater than his value and reject an
o¤er otherwise. Given the buyers strategy, the two buyer types who have the same v1
but draw from di¤erent distributions behave the same, so the seller can only distinguish
the buyers value v1 but cannot tell the buyers distribution d. As demonstrated in Figure
2.2, the sellers posterior beliefs conditional on v1 = l and v1 = h are both below (above)
the cuto¤ belief  when she has a pessimistic (an optimistic) ex ante belief. Therefore, a
pessimistic seller always o¤ers p2 = l and an optimistic seller always o¤ers p2 = h given the
buyers equilibrium strategy. Since the sellers second-period o¤er does not depend on the
buyers acceptance/rejection action in the rst period, truth-telling is the buyers equilibrium
strategy in period 1.
Given the buyers rst-period strategy, a pessimistic seller o¤ers equilibrium price p1 = l
and all buyer types accept p1.
Proposition 5 (Pessimistic Seller). When the seller is pessimistic (0 <  < e), there is
a unique D1 equilibrium outcome: the seller o¤ers pt = l and all buyer types accept pt, for
t = 1; 2.
When the seller has an optimistic ex ante belief, she always o¤ers pt = h on the equilib-
rium path and the h-value types accept the o¤er.
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Proposition 6 (Optimistic Seller). When the seller is optimistic (b <  < 1), there is a
unique D1 equilibrium outcome: the seller o¤ers pt = h, the buyer types with vt = h accept
pt and the buyer types with vt = l reject pt, for t = 1; 2.
Remark: Although the buyer has a unique equilibrium strategy when the seller has extreme
ex ante beliefs, multiple equilibria arise since di¤erent beliefs can be assigned after all buyer
types reject p1  l or after all buyer types accept p1 > h to support the uniqueD1 equilibrium
outcome presented in Proposition 5 and 6.
The outcome in Proposition 6 is of particular interest to us. In the model of Hart and
Tirole (1988), in which the buyers value is private information but the value distribution is
common knowledge, it does not happen in any equilibrium that the h-value buyer accepts
p1 = h with probability one, even if the seller has a very optimistic ex ante belief of the
buyers value. The intuition is that, the seller will o¤er p2 = l after rejection if the h-value
buyer accepts p1 = h with probability one, and then the h-value buyer has an incentive to
deviate to reject p1 = h. Therefore, when the seller has a su¢ ciently optimistic ex ante
belief, introducing the uncertainty about the buyers value distribution improves the sellers
revenue. We will discuss the revenue comparison between our model and Hart and Tiroles
(1988) in more detail in Section 6.
2.5.2 Seller with Moderate Ex Ante Beliefs
When the seller has a moderate ex ante belief, the buyers strategy is quite di¤erent from
when the seller has an extreme ex ante belief. First, the buyer does not always truthfully
reveal his value anymore. Since the separation between l-value buyer types and h-value buyer
types is an important feature of the equilibria, the seller o¤ers high price in the second period
conditional on v1 = h and low price conditional on v1 = l. This gives the l-value buyer types
an incentive to signal their current values, and at the same time, gives the h-value buyer types
an incentive to conceal their rst-period value. Second, the buyer has multiple equilibrium
strategies instead of unique equilibrium strategy. In particular, two l-value buyer types may
reject or accept p1 less than l but close to l in equilibrium. Intuitively, l-value types can
signal their value by rejecting such a p1 and have a low o¤er in the second period. On the
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other hand, it is also optimal for the l-value types to accept such a p1 if the buyer believes
that the seller o¤ers a same price after acceptance and rejection of p1. Finally, some buyer
types sometimes use a mixed strategy instead of a pure strategy, which will be elaborated
in the discussion below. Next we present two equilibrium strategies of the buyer in Figure
2.3 and 2.4 and provide the general results in Lemma 7.
all types
accept
all types
reject
(F,l), (G,l) reject
(F, h) accepts
(G, h) randomizes
(F,l), (G,l) reject
(F,h), (G,h) accept
h 1pp~p
Figure 2.3: One Equilibrium Strategy of the Buyer for Moderate Seller
In Figure 2.3, it is part of an equilibrium strategy for buyer types with v1 = l to reject and
buyer types with v1 = h to accept p1 2 (p; ep], where p = l qF (h  l) and ep = h qG(h  l).
Given the buyers behavioral strategy for p1 2 (p; ep], the seller is able to distinguish a high-
value buyer type from a low-value buyer type, so she o¤ers p2 = l after rejection of p1 and
p2 = h after acceptance of p1. Therefore, the buyer types with v1 = l have an incentive
to reject an o¤er less than l in order to signal their current value, since there is a positive
probability for them to draw a high value in the second period and gain a positive payo¤ if
the seller o¤ers p2 = l. The buyer types with v1 = h, however, still accept an o¤er in this
range since it is still much less than their current value h. The cuto¤prices p = l qF (h  l)
and ep = h   qG(h   l) are the highest prices that buyer type (F; l) and (G; h) are willing
to accept respectively given that the seller o¤ers p2 = l after rejection and p2 = h after
acceptance.
For p1 less than p, all buyer types including those with v1 = l accept p1 since the payo¤
in the second period cannot compensate the loss from rejecting such a low price in the rst
period. Correspondingly, all buyer types reject p1 greater than h.
For p1 greater than ep but less than h, the buyer types with v1 = l reject p1, buyer type
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(F; h) accepts p1, and buyer type (G; h) plays mixed strategy. To see the intuition, suppose
all the buyer types reject the o¤er, then buyer type (F; h) has an incentive to deviate to
accept p1 since he gains an positive payo¤ in the rst period and gets the lowest o¤er in the
second period by revealing his distribution. Given that buyer type (F; h) accepts p1, buyer
type (G; h) has an incentive to accept p1 as well. However, the sellers posterior belief after
acceptance of p1 is then above the cuto¤ belief  since her ex ante belief is moderate. The
seller then o¤ers p2 = l after rejection and p2 = h after acceptance of p1. Since p1 is greater
than ep, buyer type (G; h) then has an incentive to reject p1. Therefore, buyer type (G; h)
randomizes to accept and reject p1 2 (ep; h] in equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategy in Figure 2.3, however, is not the unique equilibrium strategy.
Figure 2.4 shows another equilibrium strategy of the buyer.
all types
accept
all types
reject
(F,l), (G,l) reject
(F, h) accepts
(G, h) randomizes
(F,l), (G,l) reject
(F,h), (G,h) accept
h 1pl p
~
Figure 2.4: Another Equilibrium Strategy of the Buyer for Moderate Seller
In Figure 2.4, it is part of an equilibrium strategy for all buyer types to accept p1  l.
Given that all buyer types accept p1, the seller can always assign the same posterior belief
after rejection as after acceptance of p1  l by the denition of PBE, then all buyer types
should accept p1 less than v1.
Figure 2.5 and Lemma 7 summarize the buyers strategy. Besides the two strategies
discussed above, it is also part of an equilibrium strategy that buyer type (G; l) rejects
p1 2 (p; l], the buyer types with v1 = h accept p1 2 (p; l], and buyer type (F; l) plays mixed
strategy.
Lemma 7. When the seller has a moderate prior belief (e <  < b), the buyers strategy in
22
all types
accept
all types
reject
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Figure 2.5: Buyers Strategy for Moderate Seller
a D1 equilibrium is as follows8:
(i) if p1  p, all buyer types accept p1;
(ii) if p < p1  l, (1) all buyer types accept p1; or (2) types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1,
and types (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1; or (3) type (G; l) rejects p1, type (F; l) randomizes,
and types (G; h) and (F; h) accept p1;
(iii) if l < p1  ep, types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, and types (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1;
(iv) if ep < p1  h, types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, type (G; h) randomizes, and type
(F; h) accepts p1;
(v) if p1 > h, all buyer types reject p1.
There are several points we nd important about the equilibrium strategies presented
above. First, although some buyer types strategically reject an o¤er less than their rst-
period value, all buyer types truthfully reject p1 > v1, and the buyer never incurs a loss in
any period in equilibrium. As shown in Lemma 3, the seller o¤ers p2 = l after rejection with
a probability at least as large as after acceptance of p1, so no buyer type has an incentive to
accept an o¤er larger than his value.
Second, in the equilibrium strategy in Figure 2.3, the highest rst-period o¤er accepted
by all buyer types, p, is less than the buyers lowest value l. This feature is also found by
Blume (1990), Kennan (2001), and Loginova and Taylor (2007). In all these models including
8We require that the buyers strategy is left continuous for the cuto¤ prices p1 2 fp; l; ep; hg, that is, the
behavioral strategy following the cuto¤ prices are the same as the strategy following p1   .
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ours, a buyer type with a low value in the current period has a positive probability of drawing
a high value in the next period, so the low-value type will reject an o¤er less than but close
to the low value if rejection can help the seller price discriminate in the next period.
Finally, the equilibrium strategies in this paper are di¤erent from those in Kennan (2001).
In Kennan (2001), the buyers value changes according to a Markov process, so the sellers
posterior belief becomes more optimistic when all buyer types accept a pooling o¤er, and
the seller o¤ers an aggressive screening o¤er following acceptance of several pooling o¤ers
when her posterior belief grows beyond some cuto¤. This pattern is described as a cyclic
equilibrium. In our model, the sellers posterior belief is the same as her ex ante belief after
acceptance of a pooling o¤er. So we do not expect that the same pattern as in the cyclic
equilibrium emerges in this model, even in a longer horizon.
Next we discuss the sellers optimal p1 and then conclude by describing the equilibria of
the game. For moderately pessimistic and moderately optimistic seller respectively, we rst
provide the sellers payo¤s from o¤ering the cuto¤ prices p1 2 fp; l; ep; hg, and then discuss
the conditions for there to exist pooling and semi-separating equilibria.
From Lemma 7, buyer types (F; l) and (G; h) may play a mixed strategy for some range
of p1. We use X and Y  to denote the probabilities that buyer types (F; l) and (G; h)
randomize to reject p1 respectively when the seller has a moderately pessimistic ex ante
belief, and use X and Y  to denote the corresponding probabilities when the seller has
a moderately optimistic ex ante belief. The explicit expressions for X, Y , X, and Y 
are independent of p1 and calculated in the proof of Lemma 7. All cases presented below in
Proposition 8-11 arise for a non-negligible set of parameters.9
2.5.2.1 Moderately Pessimistic Seller (e <  < ) Dene the following payo¤s
from o¤ering p1 2 fp; l; ep; hg for the seller with moderately pessimistic ex ante beliefs. Given
Lemma 7, the seller can always guarantee payo¤ U1 by o¤ering p1 = p and p2 = l, with p1
and p2 accepted by all buyer types. U1 is the sellers lowest payo¤ from a pooling o¤er.
U1 = p+ l;
9This is proved using Mathematica. The program is available upon request.
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Since there are multiple equilibrium strategies for the buyer given p1 2 (p; l], the sellers
payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = l depends on the buyers strategy. Suppose that all buyer types
choose to accept p1 = l, then the seller can achieve the highest payo¤ from a pooling o¤er
U2 by o¤ering p1 = p2 = l, with p1 and p2 accepted by all buyer types.
U2 = l + l;
However, if given p1 = l, buyer type (G; l) rejects p1, buyer type (F; l) randomizes, and buyer
types (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1, then the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = l is U3.
U3 = [q
G + (1  )qF + (1  )(1  qF )(1 X)]l + l;
Notice that if both l-value buyer types choose to reject and both h-value buyer types choose
to accept p1 = l, then o¤ering p1 = l is dominated by o¤ering p1 = ep. Payo¤ U4 is achieved
if the seller o¤ers p1 = ep. By Lemma 7, buyer types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, buyer types
(F; h) and (G; h) accept p1, and the seller o¤ers p2 = l if p1 is rejected and p2 = h if p1 is
accepted.
U4 = [q
G + (1  )qF ]ep+ [(qG)2 + (1  )(qF )2]h
+[(1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF )]l;
Finally, if the seller o¤ers p1 = h, buyer type (G; h) randomizes, buyer type (F; h) accepts
p1, and buyer types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, then the sellers payo¤ is U5.
U5 = [q
G(1  Y ) + (1  )qF ]h+ l:
When the seller has moderately pessimistic ex ante beliefs, we nd that there always
exists a pooling equilibrium with p1 = l on the equilibrium path, since the highest payo¤from
a pooling o¤er, i.e. U2, is always greater than the highest payo¤ from a semi-separating o¤er,
i.e. maxfU3; U4; U5g, for a moderately pessimistic seller. Surprisingly, this result implies that
the payo¤s of a moderately pessimistic seller is no better than those of a pessimistic seller.
The equilibrium outcome with all buyer types accepting p1 = p2 = l is the best outcome for
the moderately pessimistic seller. Intuitively, although a moderately pessimistic seller has a
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larger ex ante belief than a pessimistic seller, the buyers strategic action makes the seller
even worse o¤.
Recall that the buyer has multiple equilibrium strategies for p1 2 [p; l]: all buyer types
accept p1, or the h-value types accept p1 and the l-value types reject p1. When the lowest
payo¤ from a pooling o¤er, i.e. U1, is greater than maxfU4; U5g, any p1 2 [p; l] can arise in
a pooling equilibrium, with the l-value buyer types accepting p1  p1 and rejecting p1 > p1.
When U1 is less than maxfU4; U5g, we can nd a pooling o¤er p0 2 [p; l] which gives the seller
the same payo¤ as maxfU4; U5g. Then any p1 2 [p0; l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium,
with the l-value buyer types accepting p1  p1 and rejecting p1 > p1.
Proposition 8 (MP Seller: Pooling Equilibrium). When the seller is moderately pes-
simistic, there always exists a pooling D1 equilibrium with p1 = l.
(i) If U1 > maxfU4; U5g, any p1 2 [p; l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium;
(ii) If U1 < maxfU4; U5g, any p1 2 [p0; l], with p < p0 < l, can arise in a pooling
equilibrium.
Proposition 9 presents the conditions for semi-separating D1 equilibria. If the lowest
payo¤ from a pooling o¤er U1 is greater than the highest payo¤ from a semi-separating o¤er,
then there is no semi-separating equilibrium. On the contrary, if U1 is less than the highest
payo¤ from a semi-separating o¤er, then semi-separating equilibria exist. Furthermore, if
p1 = ep or p1 = h gives the highest payo¤ among all semi-separating o¤ers, the equilibrium
path of the semi-separating equilibria is unique. If p1 = l gives the highest semi-separating
payo¤, then a continuum equilibrium price p1 2 [p00; l], with p < p00 < l, arises.
Proposition 9 (MP Seller: Semi-separating Equilibrium). When the seller is mod-
erately pessimistic, the semi-separating D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If U1 > maxfU3; U4; U5g, no semi-separating equilibrium exists;
(ii) If U1 < maxfU3; U4; U5g = maxfU4; U5g, semi-separating equilibria exist and the
path is unique, with p1 = ep or p1 = h;
(iii) If U1 < maxfU3; U4; U5g = U3, any p1 2 [p00; l], with p < p00 < l, can arise in a
semi-separating equilibrium, so does p1 = ep or p1 = h if maxfU4; U5g > U1.
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2.5.2.2 Moderately Optimistic Seller ( <  < b) In this subsection we discuss
the pooling equilibria and semi-separating equilibria for a seller with moderately optimistic
ex ante beliefs. Similar to last subsection, we start with the sellers payo¤s from o¤ering
the cuto¤ prices p1 2 fp; l; ep; hg. Each payo¤ discussed below is corresponding to the payo¤
discussed for the moderately pessimistic seller. V1 is the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = p
and p2 = h, with p1 accepted by all buyer types and p2 accepted by types with v2 = h. Notice
that a moderately optimistic seller o¤ers p2 = h when all buyer types accept p1, which is
di¤erent from a moderately pessimistic seller. V1 is the sellers lowest payo¤ from a pooling
o¤er.
V1 = p+ [q
G + (1  )qF ]h;
V2 is the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = l and p2 = h, with p1 accepted by all buyer types
and p2 accepted by types with v2 = h. V2 is the sellers highest payo¤ from a pooling o¤er.
V2 = l + [q
G + (1  )qF ]h;
V3 is the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = l, buyer type (G; l) rejects p1, buyer type (F; l)
randomizes, and buyer types (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1.
V3 = [q
G + (1  )qF + (1  )(1  qF )(1 X)]l + [qG + (1  )qF ]h;
V4 is the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = ep, buyer types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, buyer
types (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1, and the seller o¤ers p2 = l if p1 is rejected and p2 = h if
p1 is accepted.
V4 = [q
G + (1  )qF ]ep+ [(qG)2 + (1  )(qF )2]h
+[(1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF )]l;
Finally, V5 is the sellers payo¤ from o¤ering p1 = h, buyer type (G; h) randomizes, buyer
type (F; h) accepts p1, and buyer types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1.
V5 = [q
G(1  Y ) + (1  )qF ]h+ [qG + (1  )qF ]h:
The proof of next two propositions are omitted since it is similar to the proof of Propo-
sition 8 and 9.
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Proposition 10 (MO Seller: Pooling Equilibrium). When the seller is moderately
optimistic, the pooling D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If V1 > maxfV4; V5g, any p1 2 [p; l] can arise in a pooling equilibrium;
(ii) If V1 < maxfV4; V5g < V2, any p1 2 [p000; l], with p < p000 < l, can arise in a pooling
equilibrium;
(iii) If V2 < maxfV4; V5g, no pooling equilibrium exists.
Di¤erent from the results for a moderately pessimistic seller, case (iii) in Proposition 10
implies that it is possible for a semi-separating equilibrium to emerge even if all buyer types
accept p1 2 (p; l]. That is, when the sellers ex ante belief is su¢ ciently optimistic, the best
pooling o¤er does not necessarily arise as an equilibrium price. This nding is di¤erent from
that of Loginova and Taylor (2007). They argue that the seller never o¤ers a rst-period
price that yields valuable information about the buyers distribution in a Good equilibrium
where all buyer types accept p1 less than l. But that conclusion depends on the assumption
of no discounting. We nd that case (iii) of Proposition 10 arises for a non-negligible set of
parameters when the discount factor is su¢ ciently low.
When the seller is moderately optimistic, the conditions for the semi-separating D1 equi-
libria are similar to those when the seller is moderately pessimistic.
Proposition 11 (MO Seller: Semi-separating Equilibrium). When the seller is mod-
erately optimistic, the semi-separating D1 equilibria are characterized as follows.
(i) If V1 > maxfV3; V4; V5g, no semi-separating equilibrium exists;
(ii) If V1 < maxfV3; V4; V5g = maxfV4; V5g, a semi-separating equilibrium exists and the
path is unique, with p1 = ep or p1 = h;
(iii) If V1 < maxfV3; V4; V5g = V3, any p1 2 [p0000; l], with p < p0000 < l, can arise in a
semi-separating equilibrium, so does p1 = ep or p1 = h if maxfV4; V5g > V1.
2.6 REVENUE COMPARISON
The most important question that this paper is concerned with is whether the seller improves
her revenue and gains more monopoly power when an additional layer of uncertainty is
28
associated with the buyers value distribution. In this section, we address this issue by
comparing the sellers revenue in our model with that in the two-period version of Hart and
Tiroles (1988) rental model in which the buyers value distribution is common knowledge.
The two-period version of Hart and Tiroles (1988) rental model is as follows. The buyer
has private information about his value, which can be either high or low. The buyers value
is drawn at the beginning of the game and xed once realized. In each period t = 1 or 2, the
seller o¤ers a rental price and the buyer decides to accept or reject the o¤er. Let  denote
the sellers ex ante belief that she is facing a high-value buyer.
In order to make a fair comparison, we require that the ex ante probabilities of the high-
value buyer in both models be equal, that is,  = qG+ (1 )qF , where  is the sellers ex
ante belief of the G distribution in our model.
The following proposition compares the revenues in the equilibria of the two models for
any ex ante belief the seller can have. When the seller has an optimistic ex ante belief,
her revenue in our model is higher than that in Hart and Tiroles (1988). As shown in
Proposition 6, the buyer types with v1 = h accept p1 = h with probability one since the
seller o¤ers p2 = h independent of whether p1 is accepted or rejected. In contrast, in the
two-period version of Hart and Tiroles (1988) rental model, the high-value buyer rejects
p1 = h with a positive probability even if the seller is optimistic enough to o¤er equilibrium
price p1 = h, since otherwise the seller o¤ers p2 = l after rejection of p1 and the high-value
buyer has an incentive to deviate to reject p1.
When the seller has a pessimistic or moderately pessimistic ex ante belief, there always
exists a pooling equilibrium in our model where the seller o¤ers p1 = p2 = l and all buyer
types accept the o¤ers. This equilibrium yields the seller the same revenue as in Hart and
Tirole (1988).
When the seller has a moderately optimistic ex ante belief, she can still be better o¤
than in Hart and Tirole (1988) if qF is small enough, qG is big enough, and the sellers ex
ante belief is su¢ ciently optimistic. However, if the sellers ex ante belief is close to the
lower bound of moderately optimistic beliefs, , then the seller is worse o¤ than in Hart
and Tirole (1988).
Proposition 12 (Revenue Comparison). If the ex ante probability of high-value buyer in
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the two-period version of Hart and Tiroles (1988) rental model is the same as in this model,
then
(i) For an optimistic seller, the sellers revenue is higher than in Hart and Tiroles
(1988);
(ii) For a moderately optimistic seller, if qF is small enough and qG is big enough, there
exists  2 (; b) such that, for all  2 (; b), the sellers revenue is higher than in Hart
and Tiroles (1988);
(iii) For a pessimistic and moderately pessimistic seller, there always exists an equilibrium
in this model which yields the same revenue as in Hart and Tiroles (1988).
From Proposition 12 we conclude that, when the seller has su¢ ciently optimistic ex ante
beliefs, the seller is better o¤ compared to the case that the distribution of the buyers value
is common knowledge.
2.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered a two-period repeated bargaining model where the seller
o¤ers a price to rent a durable good in each period. The buyers value of consuming the
durable good is drawn from a distribution in each period. The buyer has private information
not only about his value, but also about the distribution which his values are drawn from.
We compare the sellers revenue in our model with that in the two-period version of
Hart and Tiroles (1988) rental model where the distribution of the buyers value is common
knowledge, under the assumption that the ex ante probabilities of high-value buyer are the
same in the two models. We nd that the seller is better o¤ with the additional layer of
uncertainty about the buyers value distribution, when she has su¢ ciently optimistic ex ante
beliefs.
The results we found may cast some light on the longer horizon. In the current two-period
model, the seller cannot perfectly learn the buyers value distribution. It is interesting to
examine whether the seller is able to learn the buyers distribution eventually if she is allowed
to employ price experimentation in a nite or an innite horizon.
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On the other hand, this model only allows the seller to rent the durable good. For future
research, we are interested in investigating the case where the seller is able to adopt a more
general strategy, such as selling the durable good or providing both options to the buyer of
selling and renting the durable good.
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3.0 SOCIAL NORMS, INFORMATION, TRUST AMONG STRANGERS:
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Trust is a key element in specialization and trade. Yet an understanding of how trust emerges
among essentially anonymous agents who have little recourse to punishment as is typically
the case in many economic transactions has been slow to come. In this paper we exam-
ine two mechanisms by which trust and the reciprocation of trust might be sustained in a
population of anonymous strangers. We rst examine the hypothesis that trust might be
attached to a society as a whole; the fear of the destruction of that trust might su¢ ce to
enforce trustworthy behavior by all members of the society as shown by Kandori (1992).
On the other hand, such a mechanism might be too fragile and so we examine the second
possibility that trustworthiness resides at the individual rather than the societal level. In
particular, we ask whether the provision of information on individual reputations for trust-
worthiness engenders greater trust than in the case where such information is absent. We
further explore whether the free provision of reputational information is responsible for our
ndings or whether the availability of acquiring such information (at a small cost) su¢ ces
to sustain greater trust and reciprocity.
To explore these issues we conduct an experiment that makes use of the two-player
sequential trust game (Berg et al., 1995). In this game, the rst mover or investordecides
whether to invest his endowment with the second mover, the trustee, resulting in an uncertain
payo¤or decides to keep his endowment. If the investor invests, the endowment is multiplied
by a xed factor > 1 and it falls to the trustee to decide whether to keep (abscond with) this
amount or return some fraction of it to the investor, keeping the rest for himself. Subjects
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are asked to play this game for several indenite sequences, each consisting of a number
of rounds. In each round, they are randomly and anonymously matched with one another.
We examine several di¤erent treatments. In our baseline treatment (and in fact, in all of
our treatments), the trust game is parameterized in such a way that, given the number of
subjects we have and random anonymous matching, a social norm where all investors invest
(trust) and all trustees return part of the investment (reciprocate) constitutes a sequential
equilibrium. In a second treatment, everything is the same as in the baseline treatment
except that, prior to making a decision, the investor can observe the trustees action choice
in the prior round (keep or return). In a third treatment, everything is the same as in the
second treatment except that, prior to making a decision, the investor can observe a longer
history of the trustees most recent previous choices (up to 10 rounds) in all prior rounds
of the current supergame. Finally, in a fourth treatment condition, everything is the same
as in the third treatment, except that the investor must rst choose whether to pay a small
cost to view the trustees history of actions for the current supergame. If the investor does
not pay, then the game is identical to our rst, baseline treatment where the investor has no
knowledge of the prior actions of the trustee with whom he is matched.
In the rst treatment, where no individual information is available, we are able to test
whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity can be sustained by anonymous agents out of
the fear that deviating from such a norm would precipitate a contagious wave of distrust and
retaliatory non-reciprocation. We nd that there is very little trust and reciprocity in this
baseline treatment. Our second treatment asks whether minimalreputational information
at the individual level can improve matters, specically whether additional information on
the prior-round behavior of trustees (second-movers) causes these players to reciprocate
(return) more often and if so, whether this change in trusteesbehavior engenders greater
trust on the part of investors who move rst. We nd that, when minimal information
on the trustees prior-round choice is provided following the absence of such a reputational
mechanism (treatment 1 to treatment 2), it leads to a large and signicant increase in
both trust and reciprocity. However, reversing the order, when minimal information about
trustees is initially provided and then removed (treatment 2 to treatment 1) we nd no
signicant di¤erence in the level of trust and reciprocity. When the amount of information
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about trustees is increased (in our third treatment) to include up to 10 most recent rounds
of trustees actions in the current supergame, we nd that such order e¤ects disappear: the
provision of a longer history leads to signicant increases in trust and reciprocity relative
to the absence of such information. Finally, in our fourth treatment, where investors must
decide whether to purchase this longer history concerning their current matched trustee, we
nd that on average, only one-fourth of investors choose to purchase this information, so
that the other three-fourths are in the dark about the prior behavior of their current trustee.
Nevertheless, trust and reciprocity is signicantly higher in this costly information treatment
as compared with the baseline no-information treatment.
We conclude that the emergence of trust and reciprocity resides with the availability of
information at the individual level as provided, for example, by a credit bureau and not
through society-wide enforcement of a social norm of good behavior. We further conclude
that longer histories are more benecial than shorter histories in the promulgation of repu-
tational concerns.
3.2 RELATED LITERATURE
We are not the rst to explore the mechanisms supporting trust and reciprocity among
anonymous strangers. Our research draws upon several prior theoretical and experimental
studies.
3.2.1 Societal Cooperation under Random Matching in the Innitely Repeated
Prisoners Dilemma Game
With anonymous random matching, it is impossible to maintain cooperation in a repeated
game simply by punishing players who deviate. Kandori (1992) shows that cooperation may
be possible if players employ a contagious strategy in which individuals who have not
experienced a defection choose Cooperation,and individuals who have either experienced
a defection or has defected in the past chooses Defection. Specically, he models the
innitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma with anonymous random matching and shows that,
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for any xed population size, we can dene payo¤s for the Prisoners Dilemma that sustain
cooperation in a sequential equilibrium.
As pointed out by Kandori (1992), there are two substantial problems associated with a
contagious equilibrium.First, when the population is large, the argument applies only to
games with extreme payo¤ structures. Second, a single defection causes a permanent end to
cooperation and comments that this fragility may make the equilibrium inappropriate as a
model for trade.
Ellison (1994) extends Kandoris work and remedies these problems by introducing a
public randomization device which adjusts the severity of the punishment. Compared to
Kandoris (1992) results, the equilibrium in Ellison (1994) does not require excessive pa-
tience of players and applies to more general payo¤ structures. Furthermore, given public
randomizations, the equilibrium strategy supports nearly e¢ cient outcomes even when play-
ers make mistakes with a small probability.
Du¤y and Ochs (2007) conduct an experimental test of Kandoris (1992) contagious
equilibrium using groups of subjects who play an indenitely repeated two-person Prisoners
Dilemma under di¤erent matching protocols and di¤erent amounts of information transmis-
sion. Their results show that, under xed pairings there appears to develop a social norm of
cooperation as subjects gain experience, while under random matching, experience tends to
drive groups toward a far more competitive norm, even when some information is provided
about the prior choices of opponents. Thus they conclude that random matching works to
prevent the development of a cooperative norm in the laboratory. By contrast, in this study
we examine the indenitely repeated, sequential move trustgame and only consider the
case of random matching. Contrary to Du¤y and Ochs, we nd that information on the
prior behavior of others plays an important role in the trust game with random matching.
3.2.2 Social Norms under Random Matching in the Trust Game
Unlike the prisoners dilemma game, the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) has 1) sequential
moves and 2) no dominant strategy. Also, the trust game (unlike the Prisoners Dilemma
game), is more closely related to many real-life one-sided incentive problems that are found
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in credit markets, or in transactions between buyers and sellers in cyberspace (e-Commerce),
and other trading situations (including Greifs, 1989, remarkable analysis of medieval trade).1
Citing these reasons, Lee and Xie (2007) theoretically extend Kandoris (1992) argument to
the development of trust and reciprocity among anonymous, randomly matched players in the
innitely repeated trust game. In particular, Lee and Xie (2007) provide su¢ cient conditions
on trust game parameters that support a social norm of trust and reciprocity as a sequential
equilibrium among random and anonymously matched players in the absence of information
about other players. The trust game experiment we report on in this paper satises the Lee
and Xie conditions in all treatments, so that in the absence of any information about one
randomly determined opponents, a social norm of trust and reciprocity may be sustained
by the threat to move to a contagious wave of distrust and conscation. However, we
also explore the notion that some information about opponentsprior behavior may help to
sustain social norms of trust and reciprocity, as such information makes it easier for players
to discern player types thus enabling reputational considerations.
There is some experimental literature on repeated trust games that relates to this study.
Bolton et al. (2004) report an experiment that evaluates the e¤ectiveness of electronic
reputation mechanisms. A trust game with binary choices (buyer-seller game) is played
repeatedly for 30 rounds in each session. They compare the results from three treatments:
a stranger market, where individual buyers and sellers meet no more than once and the
buyer has no information about the sellers transaction history; a feedback market, which
has the same matching rule as the stranger market and provides the sellers histories of
shipping decisions to the buyer; nally, a partners market, where the same buyer-seller
pairs interact repeatedly in every round. Not surprisingly, transaction e¢ ciency, trust and
trustworthiness (reciprocity) are smallest in the stranger market, greater in the feedback
market, and greatest in the partners market. Their results imply that the information
1Kandori (1992) has a formal denition for one-sided incentive problem (Denition 4 on page 73). The
concept requires that, only one party of two players has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome,
and there is a Nash equilibrium such that the payo¤ from the equilibrium is less than the payo¤ from the
cooperative outcome for the party who has the incentive problem. The trust game we use in this paper is a
representative of one-sided incentive problems since, rst Invest by the rst mover is a best response to Return
by the second mover and only the trustee has an incentive to deviate from the outcome Invest&Return, and
second, the payo¤ for the trustee from the unique equilibrium is 0, which is less than the payo¤ from the
cooperative outcome Invest&Return.
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from others feedback and the information from ones own experience have di¤erent e¤ects
on behavior. However, their environment is of a nite duration and is not one that can
rationalize trust and trustworthiness as an equilibrium phenomenon (as is the case in our
study).
Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) examine how exogenously determined lengths of past
relationship a¤ect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships. The participants of the
experiment play several supergames. A supergame is a sequence of trust games played be-
tween the same two players. The lengths of supergames were drawn prior to the rst session.
The treatments focus on whether an initial sequence of short- or long- supergames impacts
on the extent of trust and trustworthiness later. They nd that initial short-supergame
relationships have an immediate negative impact on both trust and trustworthiness in the
relationships that immediately follow, while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite
e¤ect. In the long run, the e¤ect declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects
gain experience.
The literature on economic institutions is also related to the random matching model
(Greif, 1989; Milgrom et al., 1990). These papers model a large number of traders who are
randomly paired with each other in each period. Each pair is presumed to play a game
similar to the trust game, where one party has an incentive to cheat the other by supplying
goods of inferior quality or reneging on promises to make future payments. In this literature,
institutions are seen as a way of avoiding the ine¢ ciency of noncooperative equilibria. Greif
(1989) and Milgrom et al. (1990) argue that the exchange of information on the identity of
cheaters or the development of a mechanism which strengthen the power of enforcement can
help sustain cooperation.
None of these studies directly addresses the question we pose here: whether the mecha-
nism that supports trust and reciprocity comes about through community enforcement (fear
of a contagious wave of distrust and conscation) or from provision of information on indi-
vidual behavior (that a¤ects the behavior of both the observed and those deciding whether
to trust). For this reason, we designed the experiment we report on in this paper.2
2Many experimental studies nd that trust and reciprocity prevail under the conditions of complete
anonymity and one-shot interaction. As these behaviors are inconsistent with all participants being payo¤
maximizers, they are often explained by psychological factors such as fairness, altruism, and inequality
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3.3 THE MODEL
In this section we briey describe the model and results of Lee and Xie (2007). The set
of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng is partitioned into two sets of equal size, the set of investors
NI = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and the set of trustees NT = fn+ 1; n+ 2; : : : ; 2ng. In each period, each
investor is matched with a trustee according to the uniform random matching rule, and they
play the trust game as a stage game. This procedure is repeated innitely and each players
total payo¤ is the expected sum of his stage payo¤s discounted by  2 (0; 1).
The stage game is as follows. At the beginning of the game, the investor is endowed with
one unit of capital and decides whether to invest the capital in the trustees business or not.
If the investor decides not to invest, the game ends and she gains a < 1 from the outside
option, and the trustee gets nothing. If the investor chooses to invest, the capital grows into
1, which is the return from the trustees business. Then the trustee decides whether to keep
all gains or to return the amount b to the investor. If the investor chooses to invest and the
trustee chooses to return, the payo¤ is b for the investor and 1   b for the trustee. If the
investor chooses to invest but the trustee chooses to keep, then the investor gets nothing and
the trustee gets 1. We assume 0 < a < b < 1. The trust game and its payo¤ structure is
described in Figure 3.1.
If the game is played once, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the investor not
to invest and for the trustee to keep all gains. Since the return from capital in the trustees
business is bigger than the outside option a of the investor, it is e¢ cient for the investor to
invest. Although the e¢ cient outcome can not be achieved in the one-shot trust game, we
will show below that it can be achieved in the "contagious equilibrium" when the trust game
is innitely repeated, even if the opponents are randomly rematched after each period.
We dene No Invest as the defection of an investor and Keep as the defection of a trustee.
Dene d-type investors or trustees as those whose history include defection of themselves or
their partner, otherwise the players are c-type.
Denition 2. The contagious strategy is dened as follows: An investor invests if she is
aversion etc. (Berg et al. (1995), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), see Camerer (2003)
for a survey).
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Figure 3.1: The Trust Game
c-type and does not invest if she is d-type. A trustee returns if he is c-type and keeps if he
is d-type.
The idea of the contagious strategy is that trust is applied to the community as a whole
but cannot be applied to each individual player due to anonymity. Therefore, a single
defection by a member means the end of trust in the whole community, and a player who
experiences dishonest behavior starts defecting all of his or her opponents (Kandori, 1992).
Now we show below that we can dene payo¤s for the trust game which allow trust and
reciprocity in a sequential equilibrium for any nite population.
Theorem 13. Consider the random matching model described above where 2n  4 players
play a trust game. Then for any  and n, there exist a and b such that (i) 0 < a < b < 1; and
(ii) the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium in which (Invest, Return) is
the outcome in every period along the equilibrium path under uniformly random matching.
From the literature of repeated games, it is su¢ cient to show that one-shot deviations
are not protable after any history in order to show that the contagious strategy constitutes
a sequential equilibrium. In particular, Lee and Xie (2007) show that the conditions in
the following lemma control the investors and the trusteesincentive of one-shot deviations
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from the contagious strategy both on-the-equilibrium-path and o¤-the-equilibrium-path, and
given any  and n they can always nd a proper payo¤prole a and b such that 0 < a < b < 1
for the binary trust game to satisfy these conditions.
Before moving onto the lemma, we rst introduce f() and g() as functions of . Con-
ceptually, f() is the gain for a trustee from deterring starting a defection when all the
other players in the community are c-type, and g() is the gain for the d-type trustee from
deviating from defection (i.e., continuing to return) given that there are one d-type investor
and one d-type trustee (himself) in the current period. So f() and g() are the payo¤s
in the future periods for a d-type trustee from slowing down the contagious procedure in
the current period at di¤erent states of the world (i.e., when there are di¤erent numbers of
d-type investors and d-type trustees currently in the community).
To provide a formal expression of f() and g(), more notations are necessary. Let Xt
be the total number of d-type investors and Yt be the total number of d-type trustees at the
beginning of period t. The state of the world in period t, Zt, contains information about
the number of d-type investors and d-type trustees in the current period and is dened as a
one-to-one and onto function from (Xt; Yt) to the set of natural numbers f1; 2; :::; n(n+2)g:
Zt = (n+ 1)Xt + Yt for Xt + Yt > 0:
Let A be an n(n+2)n(n+2) transition matrix when all players follow the contagious
strategy. It has elements
aij = PrfZt+1 = j j Zt = ig:
For example, a12 = PrfZt+1 = 2 j Zt = 1g = Prf(Xt+1; Yt+1) = (0; 2) j (Xt; Yt) = (0; 1)g
denotes the probability that there are two d-type trustees and no d-type investors in next
period given one d-type trustee and no d-type investors in the current period. Similarly, let B
be an n(n+2)n(n+2) transition matrix when the d-type trustee in consideration deviates
from the contagious strategy while all other players still follow the strategy, with elements
bij = PrfZt+1 = j j Zt = i and one d-type trustee deviates to Return}. So matrix B   A
characterizes how the di¤usion of d-type players is delayed if one d-type trustee unilaterally
deviates from the contagious strategy. Dene  as an n(n + 1)  1 column vector with the
ith element equal to the conditional probability for the trustee to meet a c-type investor
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when the state is i in period t. Finally, let ei be a 1  n(n + 2) row vector with the ith
element equal to 1 and all other elements equal to 0. So f() = e1(B   A)(I   A) 1 is
the increase in the sum of the expected probability to meet a c-type investor (and also the
increase in the sum of the expected payo¤) for the d-type trustee in all the future periods
when this d-type trustee chooses to deviate from defection (i.e. to return) given that the
d-type trustee is the only d-type player. Similarly, g() = en+2(B   A)(I   A) 1 is the
increase in the sum of the expected payo¤ (and the probability to meet a c-type investor)
in future periods for the d-type trustee from slowing down the contagious procedure given
currently there are one d-type trustee and one d-type investor.3
Lemma 14. The contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium if
a  n  1
n
b; (3.1)
and
g()  b  f(): (3.2)
Condition (3.1) in the lemma means that the loss of deviation from the contagious strat-
egy o¤-the-equilibrium-path for an investor (i.e., deviation from defection, that is, continuing
to invest for a d-type investor) is greater than the benet of deviation, even if there is only
one d-type trustee. The left hand side of inequality (3.1), a, is the investors opportunity cost
to invest, and the right hand side of inequality (3.1) is the expected payo¤ of return given
there is only one d-type trustee. So condition (3.1) controls the investors incentive to de-
viate from the contagious strategy o¤-the-equilibrium-path. Due to the nature of one-sided
incentive problem, Invest is the best response to Return, so the investor has no incentive to
deviate on-the-equilibrium-path neither. Therefore, the investor has no incentive to deviate
from the contagious strategy given any history.
The implication from condition (3.1) is that the existence of the contagious equilibrium
requires high outside option. For the development of a cooperative social norm, the concept
of contagious equilibrium requires harsh punishment scheme. Not only are deviators from
the desired behavior punished, but a player who fails to punish is in turn punished (Kandori,
3The formal derivation of f() and g(), as well as the formula for each element of matrix A and B can
be found in Lee and Xie (2007).
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1992). So an investor must defect forever once she is cheated before. To control the d-type
investors incentive from investing again o¤-the-equilibrium-path, the outside option a must
be high enough.
Condition (3.2) controls the trustees incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy
both on-the-equilibrium-path and o¤-the-equilibrium-path. Notice that b is the trustees
payo¤ of defection and the loss of not to defect at the same time. The rst part of condition
(3.2), f()  b, means that the trustees gain from defection, i.e., b, must be less than the
gain from deterring starting a defection, i.e., f(). So the trustee (also the only d-type
player) will not start a defection in the current period. The same condition guarantees that
the trustee will not start a defection in all the later periods. So it is su¢ cient to control
the trustees incentive of deviation on-the-equilibrium-path. The second part of condition
(3.2), g()  b, implies that the loss of slowing down the contagious procedure, i.e., b, must
be greater than the gain of slowing down the procedure when there is already defection in
the community. So it controls the trustees incentive of deviation o¤-the-equilibrium-path.
Finally, to show that there always exists b between g() and f(), Lee and Xie (2007) show
that g() is less than f() for any  greater than 0 given any nite population size. The
intuition is that the trustees payo¤ from slowing down the contagious procedure is greater
when the trustee in consideration is the only d-type player in the community, in which case
the contagious procedure stops completely for the current period if he chooses not to defect,
than when there are other d-type players.
3.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The main treatment variable in this paper concerns information available to the investor
in advance of his/her decision. We investigated four di¤erent informational mechanisms.
In the no informationtreatment (denoted as No), investors only know their own history
of play and payo¤ in each round. In the minimal information treatment (denoted as
Min), investors are informed of the prior-round decision of their current paired trustee, i.e.,
whether they chose Keep or Return in the event that the trustee had the opportunity to
make a choice in the prior round; if the trustee did not have an opportunity to make a
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decision in the prior round, the information reported to the investor is no choice.In the
informationtreatment (denoted as Info), investors are shown their current paired trustees
most recent previous decisions up to 10 rounds as well as the total numbers that the trustee
chose Keep and Return out of the total number that the trustee had the opportunity to make
a choice in the history. Finally, in the costly information treatment (denoted as Cost),
the system does not automatically provide investors information on their paired trustees
previous choices; in stead, the investors can choose to purchase the same information as in
the informationtreatment at a small cost.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). All of our experimental sessions involve groups of 6 subjects, who were randomly
assigned the role of Investor or Trustee at the start of each indenitely repeated supergame.4
This design gives subjects experience with both roles.
An indenitely repeated supergame was implemented as follows. The 6 subjects were
randomly matched and played the stage game. At the end of play of the stage game, a 10-
sided die was rolled. If the die came up 8 or 9, the supergame was declared over; otherwise the
game continued with another round. Subjects were randomly rematched before playing the
next round, though they remained in the same role in all rounds of the supergame. We told
them that we would play a number of sequences (i.e., indenitely repeated supergames) but
did not specify how many. For transparency and credibility purposes, we had the subjects
take turns rolling the 10-sided die themselves and calling out the result. Our design thus
implements random and anonymous matching, a discount factor  = 0:8, and the stationarity
associated with an innite horizon. All the informational mechanisms discussed above apply
to each indenitely repeated supergame. That is, when a new supergame begins, information
on the trusteebehavior in previous supergames does not carry over to the new supergame.
In the treatments where information is available, it is available from the start of the second
round of each supergame.
The parameterization of the stage game used in all experimental sessions is given in
Figure 3.2. This parameterization of the game was chosen so that conditions (3.1) and (3.2)
4In the instructions, we use neutral word First Mover for investor, Second Mover for trustee, and
sequencefor indenitely repeated supergame. We also use ABCDto denote the investor and
trustees choices. See Appendix C for instructions.
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are satised given our values n = 3 and  = 0:8. (The program for details on verication
of condition (3.2) is available upon request). While other parameterizations are possible, we
chose a parameterization that is not at the boundary of the conditions (3.1)-(3.2), but are
well within the region supporting trust and reciprocity among randomly matched players.
The cost to purchase information in the costly informationtreatment is 2 points.
Investor
Invest
ReturnKeep
No Invest
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Figure 3.2: Parameterization of the Stage Game
We use a within-subjects design in all the sessions. Subjects begin to play under one
information condition and switch to the second information condition (and then to the
third condition in some sessions). Subjects are only informed of the change of information
condition when the switch took place.
The rst set of 8 experimental sessions examines the e¤ect of minimal information
compared to no information.We conducted 4 No_Min sessions (sessions which began with
no informationand switched to minimal information, similar notations afterward) and 4
Min_No sessions. Another set of 6 sessions investigates the e¤ect of the longer history (up to
10 most recent rounds) of the trustees behavior and the possibility to purchase information at
a cost. We conducted 3 No_Info_Cost sessions and 3 Info_No_Cost sessions. We reverse
the order of the rst two treatments to examine whether the timing when information is
available matters. The treatment of costly informationis always the last treatment since
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we want to have subject experience the information for free before they decide whether to
purchase it at a cost.
In practice, there are at least 30 rounds under each information condition in all sessions.
When the total number of rounds under one information condition is over 35 rounds, the
sequence is the last sequence under that condition. In some cases the total number of rounds
under one condition is between 30 and 35.
The motivations for this experimental design are as follows. First, theory allows a social
norm of trust and reciprocity among randomly matched anonymous players to emerge under
the chosen parameterization even when no information is available. However, we cannot
exclude other equilibria, e.g., the social norm of no trust and no reciprocity. So it is of our
interest to test, in an empirical approach, rst, whether the community-wide enforcement
is enough to support the social norm of trust and reciprocity, and second, whether di¤erent
informational mechanisms can help select di¤erent social norms.
Second, since the collection and dissemination of information is always costly to the
society, a question of practical interest is how much reputational information is enough in
order to signicantly enhance the frequencies of trust and reciprocity. So we are not only
interested in comparing the di¤erence when information is available or not, but also the
di¤erence when di¤erent amount of information is available. That is our motivation to have
both the minimal informationand informationtreatments. Notice that by our design
the information shown in the minimal informationtreatment is nested in the information
treatment.
Finally, the costly informationtreatment addresses the question of whether the content
of information or the availability of information matters if reputational information is found
to improve the frequencies of trust and reciprocity. The trustees are not informed of whether
their paired investor purchases information or not, and this fact is made public information
among all the subjects. On one hand, when a portion of the investors purchase information,
there is a positive externality among the whole community due to the anonymously random
matching. On the other hand, if trustees believe that most of the investors do not purchase
information, they may behave similarly as in the no informationtreatment. So the answer
is not clear whether the availability of information is su¢ cient to signicantly enhance trust
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and reciprocity.
3.5 RESULTS
All the subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of Pitts-
burgh and Carnegie Mellon University. No subject had any prior experience participating
in our experiment. Subjects were given $5 for showing up on time and they received their
earnings from all rounds of all sequences played. Subjects accumulated points given their
stage game choices (points are shown in Figure 3.2). Points were converted into dollars at
the rate of 1 point = 0.5 cent.
Table 3.1 below provides the basic characterization of all sessions. Subjects earned on
average, $17.07 ($13.36 for the rst and $22.02 for the second set of sessions) in addition to
their $5 show-up fee. All the sessions in the rst set are nished within 1.5 hours and the
sessions in the second set are nished within 2 hours.
In the following subsections, we rst report the results from the rst set and the second
set of sessions respectively, and then analyze how di¤erent informational mechanisms a¤ect
investorsbehavior.
3.5.1 No_Min and Min_No Sessions
We rst analyze whether the provision of the minimal information, the information on the
prior-round behavior of the trustee, can signicantly increase the frequencies of trust and
reciprocity. We start with the within-subject comparison and then move to the between-
subject comparison.
Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 report respectively on the aggregate frequencies of 1) invest, 2) return
conditional on investment, and 3) combined frequencies of invest&return for the No_Min
and Min_No sessions.
The rst important nding is that the social norm of full trust and reciprocity is not
sustained in the absence of information, however, the frequencies of trust and reciprocity are
signicantly di¤erent from zero (one-tailed binomial test, p = 1%).
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Table 3.1: All Experimental Sessions
No. of No. of Avg. Avg. Payo¤
Session Supergames Rounds Payo¤ per Round
No_Min1 16 84 $12.12 $0.14
No_Min2 13 71 $14.39 $0.20
No_Min3 10 72 $14.80 $0.21
No_Min4 17 74 $13.63 $0.18
Min_No1 17 81 $17.11 $0.21
Min_No2 16 79 $12.55 $0.16
Min_No3 16 72 $12.75 $0.18
Min_No4 18 79 $9.51 $0.12
No_Info_Cost1 22 119 $25.65 $0.22
No_Info_Cost2 24 106 $22.98 $0.22
No_Info_Cost3 23 97 $20.75 $0.21
Info_No_Cost1 21 119 $25.90 $0.22
Info_No_Cost2 20 113 $17.49 $0.15
Info_No_Cost3 24 108 $19.36 $0.18
Average 18.36 91 $17.07 $0.19
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Table 3.2: Frequency of Invest for No_Min and Min_No Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment
No_Min1 0.333 0.362
No_Min2 0.618 0.793
No_Min3 0.476 0.964
No_Min4 0.521 0.676
Avg. of No_Min 0.487 0.699
Min_No1 0.674 0.865
Min_No2 0.561 0.325
Min_No3 0.333 0.746
Min_No4 0.301 0.096
Avg. of Min_No 0.467 0.508
Table 3.3: Frequency of Return-given-Invest for No_Min and Min_No Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment
No_Min1 0.526 0.760
No_Min2 0.587 0.841
No_Min3 0.780 0.972
No_Min4 0.525 0.831
Avg. of No_Min 0.605 0.851
Min_No1 0.820 0.854
Min_No2 0.797 0.725
Min_No3 0.588 0.706
Min_No4 0.649 0.364
Avg. of Min_No 0.714 0.662
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Table 3.4: Frequency of Invest&Return for No_Min and Min_No Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment
No_Min1 0.175 0.275
No_Min2 0.363 0.667
No_Min3 0.371 0.937
No_Min4 0.274 0.562
Avg. of No_Min 0.296 0.610
Min_No1 0.553 0.739
Min_No2 0.447 0.236
Min_No3 0.196 0.526
Min_No4 0.195 0.035
Avg. of Min_No 0.348 0.384
Second, there is an order e¤ect when the minimal information is provided in the rst
half and the second half of the sessions. For the No_Min sessions, the provision of minimal
information about the trustees prior-round play in the second half of the sessions leads to
signicantly larger frequencies of invest, return, and invest&return (Wilcoxon signed ranks
test, p = 0:0625 for all three tests). However, none of the frequencies of invest, return-given-
invest, and invest&return is signicantly di¤erent when the minimal information is provided
in the rst half of the Min_No sessions (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p > 0:4 for all three
tests).
There may be two possible explanations for the nding that the minimal information
has no signicant e¤ect in the Min_No sessions. One explanation is that, when the minimal
information is provided in the rst half of the sessions, it helps form the social norm of
trust and reciprocity, and the social norm does not fall apart even when the information
is removed in the second half of the sessions, i.e., the rst half and the second half of the
sessions have equally good outcomes. This explanation implies that providing information
in the rst place yields more e¢ cient outcomes.
The second explanation is that, when the information is provided in the rst half of the
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session, the subjects do not recognize the use of information very well, and they are slower
in learning how to use it, i.e., the rst half and the second half of the sessions have equally
bad outcomes. This explanation has the di¤erent policy implication: it is more e¢ cient to
provide the informational mechanism to agents who have experienced the absence of the
mechanism.
These two explanations also have di¤erent predictions. The rst explanation predicts
that the frequencies of trust and reciprocity of the no information treatment should be
higher in the Min_No sessions than in the No_Min sessions, and the frequencies of trust and
reciprocity of the minimal information treatment be indi¤erent in the Min_No sessions
and the No_Min sessions. Di¤erently, the second explanation predicts that the frequencies of
trust and reciprocity of the no informationtreatment is indi¤erent in the Min_No sessions
and the No_Min sessions, and the frequencies of trust and reciprocity of the minimal
informationtreatment is higher in the No_Min sessions than in the Min_No sessions.
Next we move on to examine the between-subject tests for all the Min_No and No_Min
sessions. In particular, we compare 1) the rst treatment of all these 8 sessions (i.e., no
informationin the No_Min sessions and minimal informationin the Min_No sessions);
2) the no information treatment of these 8 sessions; and 3) the minimal information
treatment of these 8 sessions.
Since the subjects got to know the switch of treatment when it took place in the middle
of the sessions, we can regard the rst treatment of the sessions as independent observations
which have not been inuenced by other information treatments. We nd that the frequen-
cies of invest and invest&return in the rst treatment are not signicantly di¤erent when
minimal information is provided or not. However, the frequency of return-given-invest is sig-
nicantly higher when minimal information is available (Robust Rank Order test, p = 0:05).
This implies that the provision of information has a more signicant e¤ect on trustees than
investor.
For the between-subject tests on the no informationtreatment, we nd that none of the
frequencies of invest, return-given-invest, and invest&return is signicantly di¤erent when
the treatment is in the rst half of the No_Min sessions or in the second half of the Min_No
sessions. However, for the between-subject tests on the minimal informationtreatment,
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all the frequencies of invest, return-given-invest, and invest&return are signicantly higher
when the minimal information is provided in the second half of the No_Min sessions than in
the rst half of the Min_No sessions (Robust Rank Order test, p = 0:05 for all three tests).
The ndings on the between-subjects tests support the second explanation, that is, when
the minimal information is provided after subjects su¤er from the absence of reputational
information, subjects learn to use the minimal information better.
3.5.2 No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions
In this subsection we report the results from the second set of sessions. Tables 3.5, 3.6, 3.7
report the frequencies of invest, return-given-invest, invest and return respectively. Similar to
the last subsection, we start with the within-subject analysis and then move to the between-
subject comparison.
Table 3.5: Frequency of Invest for No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.516 0.892 0.983
No_Info_Cost2 0.714 0.857 0.824
No_Info_Cost3 0.667 0.813 0.871
Avg. of No_Info_Cost 0.632 0.854 0.893
Info_No_Cost1 0.848 0.659 0.927
Info_No_Cost2 0.829 0.132 0.352
Info_No_Cost3 0.775 0.515 0.471
Avg. of Info_No_Cost 0.817 0.435 0.583
First of all, similar to the No_Min and Min_No sessions, the frequencies of trust and
reciprocity in the no informationtreatment are signicantly di¤erent from zero (one-tailed
binomial test, p = 5%), but the social norm of full trust and reciprocity is not supported.
Compared to the minimal information treatment, when the amount of information
provided to investors becomes larger, the e¤ect on increasing the frequencies of trust and
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Table 3.6: Frequency of Return-given-Invest for No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.800 0.970 0.992
No_Info_Cost2 0.680 0.867 0.775
No_Info_Cost3 0.603 0.923 0.889
Avg. of No_Info_Cost 0.694 0.920 0.885
Info_No_Cost1 0.982 0.741 0.989
Info_No_Cost2 0.931 0.471 0.838
Info_No_Cost3 0.911 0.471 0.625
Avg. of Info_No_Cost 0.941 0.561 0.817
Table 3.7: Frequency of Invest&Return for No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.413 0.865 0.975
No_Info_Cost2 0.486 0.743 0.639
No_Info_Cost3 0.402 0.750 0.774
Avg. of No_Info_Cost 0.434 0.786 0.796
Info_No_Cost1 0.833 0.488 0.917
Info_No_Cost2 0.771 0.062 0.295
Info_No_Cost3 0.706 0.242 0.294
Avg. of Info_No_Cost 0.770 0.264 0.502
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reciprocity becomes more signicant. We nd that the provision of the longer history on
the trustees previous behavior signicantly increases the frequencies of invest, return, and
invest&return, regardless of whether the informationtreatment is used after or before the
no informationtreatment. (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p = 0:05 for all three
tests, using six sessions as observations)
Even when information is not provided automatically, instead, investors are provided
with the possibility to purchase information at a cost of 2 points, the frequencies of trust
and reciprocity are still signicantly increased compared to when no information is available.
(one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p = 0:05 for all three tests, using six sessions as
observations)
The di¤erence between the informationtreatment and the costly informationtreat-
ment, however, is not very signicant. We nd the frequencies of invest and invest&return
are not signicantly di¤erent in the informationtreatment and costly informationtreat-
ment. The frequency of return is signicantly higher in the informationtreatment than in
the costly informationtreatment. (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p = 0:1, using
six sessions as observations) This evidence implies that trusteesbehavior is more sensitive
to the change in the treatment than investorsbehavior, which is consistent with the ndings
in the No_Min and Min_No sessions.
By our design, there is no information available in the rst round of a sequence in any
treatment, so an alternative way to examine the treatment e¤ect is to compare the frequencies
of trust and reciprocity for the rounds excluding the rst rounds. We nd that the same
results hold when the rst rounds are excluded. The frequencies of invest, return-given-
invest, and invest&return excluding the rst rounds are in Appendix D.
Although the frequencies of trust and reciprocity are signicantly increased when in-
formation is provided or available to purchase, one may be concerned whether the players
payo¤ or the e¢ ciency of the society is also consistently increased with the same information
mechanism. The following table presents the average payo¤per round under each treatment.
We nd that, similar to the frequencies of trust and reciprocity, playersaverage payo¤ is sig-
nicantly increased when the information is provided automatically or available to purchase
compared to the case when the information is absent (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
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p = 0:05 for both tests, using six sessions as observations).
Table 3.8: PlayersAverage Payo¤ per Round in Points
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 34 46 49
No_Info_Cost2 41 45 44
No_Info_Cost3 39 44 46
Avg. of No_Info_Cost 38 45 46
Info_No_Cost1 45 39 48
Info_No_Cost2 44 22 29
Info_No_Cost3 43 34 33
Avg. of Info_No_Cost 44 32 37
Now we move to the between-subject analysis for the second set of 6 sessions. First, we
focus on the rst treatment of all the 6 sessions. Di¤erent from the No_Min and Min_No
sessions, we nd that providing the larger amount of information signicantly increases the
frequencies of invest, return-given-invest, and invest&return (one-sided Robust Rank-Order
test, p = 0:05). This evidence again shows that the informationmechanism is more e¤ec-
tive than the minimal informationmechanism in enhancing trust and reciprocity. Second,
we examine the third treatment of all the 6 sessions. We nd that none of the frequencies
of trust and reciprocity is signicantly di¤erent. This nding implies that there is no sig-
nicant order e¤ect, that is, whether the subjects experience no informationtreatment or
informationtreatment rst and then switch to the other one does not signicantly a¤ect
their behavior in the third treatment costly information.Finally, we also check whether
subjectsbehavior of the no informationtreatment and informationtreatment is di¤er-
ent when the same treatment is the rst or the second treatment in the session. We nd that
there is no signicant di¤erence for most cases except that the frequency of invest in the no
informationtreatment is slightly higher when no informationis the rst treatment than
when it is the second treatment (Robust Rank-Order test, p = 0:1).
As a summary, the No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost sessions present several important
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ndings. First, providing longer history on trustees previous behavior has a larger e¤ect in
enhancing trust and reciprocity compared to just providing the trustees prior-round choice.
The e¤ect of information is robust regardless of whether information is provided before
or after the no information treatment, and also in both within-subjects and between-
subjects sessions. Second, providing the possibility to purchase information at a small cost
is su¢ cient to support the similar e¢ cient outcome as in the case where information is
provided automatically for free.
3.5.3 Use of Information
This subsection focuses on how information in di¤erent treatments a¤ects investorsbehavior.
We rst analyze the e¤ect of minimal information, and then the larger amount of information
and costly information.
3.5.3.1 Minimal Information Figure 3.3 below presents the frequency of invest condi-
tional on the prior-round choice of the trustee (i.e., Keep or Return) in the no information
treatment, the minimal informationtreatment of the No_Min sessions and the Min_No
sessions respectively.
There are several interesting ndings. First, the frequency of invest is higher when the
trustees prior-round choice is Returnthan Keepno matter whether or not the investors
are informed of the trustees prior-round behavior. In the minimal informationtreatment,
this implies that investors respond in a correct direction with the information revealed.
When no information is available, however, this evidence suggests that investorsown expe-
rience in early periods a¤ects their belief over the reputation of the whole community, and
consequently a¤ects their trusting behavior in the current period.
Although investorsresponse conditional on trusteeprior-round choices is in the correct
direction even when no information is shown to the investors, the minimal information
still has its value. In particular, the frequency of invest conditional on Keep in the no
informationtreatment is larger than in the minimal informationtreatment, furthermore,
the frequency of invest conditional on Returnin the no informationtreatment is smaller
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of Invest Conditional on Trustees Prior-Round Choice
than in the minimal informationtreatment.
There is also an order e¤ect in terms of whether the minimal informationis the rst
or the second treatment of the sessions. The di¤erence between the frequency of invest
conditional on Returnand Keepis larger when the minimal informationis provided
in the second half than in the rst half of the sessions, which implies that the investors learn
how to use information better after experiencing the absence of information. This nding is
consistent with the aggregate data.
Finally, Figure 3.3 also suggests that investorsbehavior does not completely reply on
the information about trustees previous behavior. Investors still invest with a positive
probability even if the information shows that their current partners defected in the prior
round, and they do not fully trust when the partner is revealed cooperative last period. There
are several possibilities. One explanation is that there exist a small portion of investors who
always cooperate (trust) or always defect (distrust). Another explanation is that subjects
make mistakes or experiments to learn and subsequently adjust their behavior. It is also
possible that, even in the presence of information, investorsbehavior is still inuenced by
their own experience as suggested by the contagious hypothesis.
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3.5.3.2 Informationand Costly InformationTreatment Figure 3.4 shows the
frequency of invest conditional on the trustees aggregate frequency of return in the history of
the current sequence in the informationand costly informationtreatment respectively.
The x axis is the frequency of return by the trustee (denoted as r), which is divided into
three ranges (0 <= r  1=3, 1=3 < r  2=3, 2=3 < r  1). For the costly information
treatment, the frequency of invest is calculated when the information is purchased and shown
to the investors.
Figure 3.4: Frequency of Invest Conditional on Trustees Aggregate Ratio of Return
From Figure 3.4, the frequency of invest is monotonically increasing in the ratio of re-
turn by the trustee in both informationand costly informationtreatments. One strike
di¤erence between these two treatments, however, is that the frequency of invest conditional
on a low ratio of return in the informationtreatment is much higher than in the costly
information treatment. In particular, for the information treatment, the frequency of
invest is more than 20% when the trustees ratio of return is less than or equal to 1/3, and
it is around 45% when the trustees ratio of return is between 1/3 and 2/3. However, for the
costly informationtreatment, the frequency of invest is less than 10% when the trustees
ratio of return is less than or equal to 1/3, and it is around 11% when the trustees ratio of
return is between 1/3 and 2/3.
For the costly informationtreatment, the average percentage of information purchase
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is 24.49%. Combined with the nding that the frequency of trust and reciprocity is not
signicantly di¤erent between the informationand costly informationtreatment, it im-
plies that the availability of information creates a large positive externality. The frequency of
invest is 72.48% when information is not purchased, in comparison with 65.55% when infor-
mation is purchased. (All analysis here does not include the rst rounds, where information
is not available to purchase.)
In the following table we take a closer look at which subjects bought information and how
often they bought information. Each cell in Table 3.9 shows the ratio of the total number
that each subject in each session purchased information over the total number that each
subject was able to purchase information (i.e., the subject was assigned as an Investor in the
costly informationtreatment excluding the rst round of all sequences).
Table 3.9: Frequency of Information Purchase for Each Subject
Session Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6
No_Info_Cost1 0/14 0/9 0/7 21/21 0/18 0/24
No_Info_Cost2 4/27 2/2 5/24 2/6 19/26 0/2
No_Info_Cost3 0/8 2/20 11/11 3/5 2/2 0/23
Info_No_Cost1 0/23 N/A 0/4 0/23 1/9 0/16
Info_No_Cost2 0/19 0/14 0/19 4/12 1/1 15/16
Info_No_Cost3 1/7 5/20 1/3 0/7 20/20 0/24
In Table 3.9 ratios over 0.5 are in bold. Notice that 9/36=1/4 of subjects purchased more
than half times when information is available. About half of subjects (17/36) never chose to
buy information. One subject was never assigned as an Investor in the costly information
treatment. The remaining 1/4 of subjects bought information at least once, but by less than
half times when information is available.
One possible explanation for the evidence in Figure 3.4 is that some investors rely more
on the information than other investors, however, some investors tend to trust even when
the information on the trustees previous behavior is not favorable. When the information
is shown automatically, the trusting behavior of the latter investors increases the frequency
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of invest corresponding to a low ratio of return by the trustees. In the costly information
treatment, investors who rely more seriously on the information choose to purchase the
information, while those investors who tend to ignore the information choose not to purchase
the information.
In order to examine whether subjects behave di¤erently regarding to information, we
divide all the subjects into two sets, by whether the frequency that the subjects purchased
information is over or less than1/2 (i.e. whether the ratio in Table 3.9 is bold or not). Then
we go back to the informationtreatment and calculate the frequency of invest conditional
on the ratio of return for these two sets of investors.
Table 3.10: Frequency of Invest for Two sets of Investors in the Information Treatment
Sets of investors 0  r  1=3 1=3 < r  2=3 2=3 < r  1
Freq. of Purchase>1/2 0.286 0.333 0.875
Freq. of Purchase<1/2 0.143 0.478 0.874
Surprisingly, for those investors who purchased information with a frequency over 50%
in the costly informationtreatment, the frequency of invest corresponding to r  1=3is
larger than that of the other set of investors who did not purchase information very often.
This evidence does not support the hypothesis that the nding in Figure 3.4 comes from
the fact that some investors always rely more seriously on the information and tend to buy
information more frequently than other investors. In stead, it seems to suggest that investors
punish more severely when they pay to see the information on trustees bad behavior than
when the information is sent automatically.
3.6 CONCLUSION
We have studied the development of trust and reciprocity among strangers in the indenitely
repeated trust game with random matching. The main treatment variable is the amount of
information on the trustees previous behavior.
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Although the parameters of the game are chosen to support the social norm of trust
and reciprocity as an equilibrium in all treatments, we nd that full trust and reciprocity
is di¢ cult to sustain when no reputational information is available. Providing reputational
information increases the frequencies of trust and reciprocity, and the e¤ect of information
becomes more signicant when the amount of information is larger. Furthermore, provid-
ing the possibility to purchase information at a small cost also signicantly increases the
frequencies of trust and reciprocity compared to the case when the information is absent.
Our ndings help explain the emergence and prevalence of the reputation system in many
important economic transactions between randomly and anonymously individuals, such as
the online feedback system on eBay or the credit bureau. The signicant contribution of
this paper is that we identied the importance of individual information in sustaining the
e¢ cient outcome. This understanding is of obvious importance to the design and operation
of economic institutions.
For future research, we are interested in designing and comparing di¤erent reputational
mechanisms that improve the e¢ ciency of the markets with random and anonymous players.
For instance, one comparison is between the online feedback system and credit bureau. On-
line feedback system is a representative of decentralized information collection by voluntary
contribution and with free dissemination. On the contrary, the traditional credit bureau
collects information in a centralized and mandatory method. Although we have shown in
this paper that providing reputational information signicantly increases e¢ ciency, we still
have not solved the practical issue of how to provide or nance the reputational system.
Comparing the e¢ ciency of these two commonly used mechanisms may help answer the
question.
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4.0 MOTIVES FOR CHARITABLE GIVING
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Fifty-ve percent of American households give to secular charities. The average given among
donor households is just under one thousand dollars.1 In trying to model and better un-
derstand this behavior economists have argued that most of the benets derived from such
contributions can be classied as being either public or private in nature. On the public side
is the purely altruistic benet one may get from knowing that the collected funds help feed
a starving child, secure vaccines against malaria, provide shelter for the homeless etc. On
the private side is the benet one may get from being the one who contributed the funds, be
it an internal warm-glow from having done your bit, or any other private rewards resulting
from the contribution.
While the rst economic models on charitable contribution simply focused on the purely
altruistic motive for giving, economists have now accepted the impure altruismmodel where
in addition donors benet from being the one who secures the gift. Empirical studies on
the motives for giving suggest that pure altruism is an incorrect characterization of peoples
preferences for giving. However to date researchers have not subjected the impure altruism
model to a direct empirical test, and we have yet to get a sense of the relative weights donors
may attach to the two benets from giving.
We present an experimental study which tests comparative static predictions of both
the pure and impure altruism model. In contrast to previous studies we account for the
1Authorscalculation based on the 2005 Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, the philanthropy module
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Seculargiving is giving to relieve poverty, to human services, to
improve peoples health, education, the arts, etc., that is, all giving except giving to places of worship.
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possibility that consistent with the impure altruism model the support for pure altruism
may be sensitive to the point at which the motive for giving is evaluated. In particular
in the impure altruism model increases in the contribution of others will shift the marginal
motive for giving from a concern for altruism to a concern for the private benet from giving.
From a methodological viewpoint we develop an environment that closely mirrors those of the
theoretical models. We examine contributions to an actual charity where each participant
is informed of an initial contribution amount and singlehandedly determines the nal dollar
amount to be transferred to a recipient of the charity.
In examining charitable contributions across several budgets, we consistently nd behav-
ior in line with the comparative static predictions of the impure altruism model. However
our data also make clear that a substantial weight is attached to the altruistic component
of preferences. When estimating a representative utility function we nd, consistent with
our comparative static results, that participants get a private benet from giving, however
it accounts for but a fraction of the weight attached to the public benet associated with
providing funds for the charitys recipient. Thus we demonstrate that there are environments
for which it would be incorrect to assume that donors charitable contributions primarily are
made because of the private benet one may experience from giving.
4.2 MOTIVATION
Giving to charity can be viewed as contributing to a public good. The reason is that as
one donor contributes to a charity other individuals, who are concerned for the well-being
of the recipients of the charity, cannot be prevented from benetting from this increase in
contributions (non-exclusion) nor does the benet they experience inuence that experienced
by anyone else (non-rival). Thus denoting an individuals private consumption by xi, and
the sum of contributions to the charity by G, we may describe individual preferences by,
Ui(xi; G). This model has historically been referred to as the pure altruism model.
Economists have been quick to point out that the comparative static predictions of this
model make it unlikely that this is an appropriate description of what motivates giving. For
example, individuals who only are concerned about the total contributions to the charity
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will view contributions by others as a perfect substitute to giving by self. An implication is
that if the government imposes a lump-sum tax on a contributor and donates the tax to the
charity, then the individual will in turn decrease his charitable contribution by the size of
the tax. Thus the governments contribution completely crowds out that of the individual,
and the total amount received by the charity will be as it was before the tax was imposed.
Empirical studies of actual charitable contributions have failed to nd evidence of com-
plete crowding out. In fact most studies nd that an increase in government giving only
causes a small decrease in giving by the individual. While Bergstrom, Blume, and Var-
ian (1986) demonstrate that incomplete crowd-out may result when the governments tax
exceeds the individuals contribution, Andreoni (1991) shows that the complete crowd-out
result still holds in a large economy.2
In response to the limited private response to government giving it has been argued that
donors not only contribute because they care about the recipients of the charity, but also
because they get a private benet from being the one who secured the contribution. That
is, a donor may get, say, a warm glow from having done his share. This suggests that the
individuals private contribution needs to be included as a separate argument in the utility
function, i.e., individual preferences may be captured by Ui(xi; G; gi), where gi denotes the
individuals private contribution to the public good. In this model the contribution by others
is seen as an imperfect substitute for private giving, thus a forced contribution through taxes
is not equivalent to a voluntary one, and the individual will not decrease his contribution
by the amount of the tax. Given normality the impure altruism model therefore predicts
incomplete crowd-out and the forced contribution will result in an increase in total giving
to the public good.
In determining whether the impure altruism model is a better description of what mo-
tivates giving, researchers have examined the degree of crowd-out on actual contributions
to charity. One of the disadvantages of identifying preferences from the response in char-
itable giving to a change in government giving is that the analysis relies critically on the
assumption that donors know how much the government contributes to the charity. Thus,
2This prediction relies on the, perhaps not reasonable, assumption that the need for the public good is
independent of the population size.
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while these studies are informative in shedding light on the e¤ect an increase in govern-
ment giving has on individual contributions, inferences on preferences are more di¢ cult. To
better control the information available to donors, researchers have instead moved to the
experimental laboratory. Just as for the eld studies the focus has been on determining
how private giving responds to a forced increase in giving. That is, the objective has been
to determine whether behavior is consistent with complete crowd-out and thereby the pure
altruism model. Rejecting the null has been seen as evidence of the impure altruism model.
Andreoni (1993) is the rst to study crowd-out in the laboratory. Rather than examining
contributions to a charity, he had participants make costly contributions to a nancially
induced public good. Using payo¤ induced preferences Andreoni examined the change in
contributions when individuals were forced to contribute a certain amount to the shared
public good (i.e., imposing a lump sum tax). Contradictory to the pure altruism model he
nds a crowd-out of 71.5 percent. This leads him to reject pure altruism in favor of impure
altruism. In a follow-up study Bolton and Katok (1998) comment that Andreonis study
relies on the assumption that individuals only care about their own payo¤s and not that
of others, indeed there maybe multiple equilibria of the game when individuals have other-
regarding preferences. Instead they design a very simple dictator game where each individual
is put in a position where they must share a predetermined amount of money with another
participant in the laboratory. In one treatment the decision maker (dictator) is initially given
$18 and the recipient $2, in the other, the dictator is initially given $15 and the recipient
$5. In a between-subject analysis dictators are informed that they are free to contribute any
amount they wish to the recipient, with the contribution for the latter budget being forced
to be $3 greater than in the rst. As Andreoni (1993) they nd incomplete crowding out
(60%) and reject the pure altruism model in favor of the impure one.
Eckel, Grossman, and Johnston (2005) extend Bolton and Katoks dictator-game study
to one where contributions are made to an actual charity. Using the same allocations as
Bolton and Katok they replace the recipient with a charity of the participants choice and
nd no crowd-out in fact they see evidence of crowding in. They also examine a variant
of this treatment where the dictator is informed that his or her initial endowment is $20,
but that a certain amount already has been taxed and will be given to the charity of their
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choice. A signicant framing e¤ect is found as in this case individuals completely crowd-out
the forced contribution.
Common for the earlier studies on motives for charitable giving is that pure altruism is
the null hypothesis and rejections of the null is seen as evidence for impure altruism. Ribar
and Wilhelm (2002) however make clear that if the impure altruism model is the correct one,
then the degree of crowd-out may depend on the particular point at which one is evaluating
it. Consider for example the case where the charitable contributions by others increase,
while the individuals income is held constant. If this increase in giving occurs at a point
where the initial giving by others is low, then the donors marginal motive for giving will
be the concern for the charitys recipients. With altruism being the marginal motive for
giving, contributions by others will be viewed as a close substitute for giving by self. Thus
at low initial contributions an increase in contributions by others may result in a substantial
reduction in individual giving. As initial contributions to the charity increase, the marginal
motive for giving shifts from a concern for securing the charitys services to a concern for
the private benet or warm-glow from giving. Thus for a well-endowed charity the marginal
motive for giving will be the concern for warm-glow. An increase in giving by others will
therefore be a distant substitute for private giving, and the e¤ect on the individuals private
contribution will be limited. The sensitivity to the evaluation point suggests that to identify
the warm-glow component of giving we need to examine contributions at multiple budgets.
In an attempt to better understand what motivates charitable giving, this paper reports
on an experimental study where participants make decisions at multiple di¤erent budgets.
Varying both the participants endowment and the initial charitable contribution we can ex-
amine individual contributions at several di¤erent points and thus evaluate the comparative
static predictions of the pure and impure altruism models. In addition we make a number
of important methodological innovations to secure that we consistent with the theory are
dealing with a public good where we have complete control over the provision of the good.
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4.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To characterize the motives for charitable giving we wanted to examine an environment
where each participant had complete control over contributions to an actual charity. Thus
we did not want to examine contributions to other participants in the laboratory, nor did we
want to examine contributions to a general charity. Our only option was therefore to create
several newpublic goods, that is, a series of public goods that no one else provides, and
where the provision of each one is determined solely by the sum of a xed initial contribution
and the participants contribution. Thus we needed to nd an environment with multiple
individual public goods that could vary in size. Finally to easily identify responses to changes
we wanted a cause that would trigger substantial contributions.
In selecting a public good that not only satised the criteria above, but also had a good
reputation we were fortunate to get the American Red Cross of Southwestern Pennsylvania to
help us create a series of new public goods. In the event of a re in Southwestern Pennsylvania
this chapter of the American Red Cross helps the a¤ected families nd temporary shelter,
provide them with clothing, a meal, and give them essential toiletries. Prior to our study no
items were given to the children a¤ected by the re, and we were given permission to make
donations of books to the children. We paired each participant in the study with a child
(1-12 years old) whose family home had su¤ered extensive re damage. The participant
was given an endowment and asked to allocate it between him- or herself and the child.
They were informed that the total amount to be spent on the child was the sum of the
participants contribution and a predetermined contribution made by the foundation funding
the study. The books purchased for the allocated money would be distributed to the child
by the American Red Cross, immediately after the child had been a¤ected by a severe re.3
Participants were informed that Each participant in this study is paired with a di¤erent
child. Only you have the opportunity to contribute books to the child, neither the American
Red Cross nor any other donors provide these books to the child.
In explaining why the American Red Cross is seeking the participants donation for these
books, they were informed that their Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Sandi Wraith
3Each child was given three books of varying value, with younger children getting the lower value books.
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had made the following statement: Childrens needs are often overlooked in the immediate
aftermath of a disaster because everyone is concerned primarily with putting the re out,
reaching safety, and nding shelter, food and clothing...just the basics of life. So many times,
Ive seen children just sitting on the curb with no one to talk to about whats happening...for
this reason Ive found trauma recovery experts in the community to work with us to train our
volunteer responders in how to address childrens needs at the scene of a disaster.......being
able to give the children fun, distracting books will provide a great bridge for our volunteers
to connect with kids and get them talking about what theyve experienced.
A total of 85 undergraduates at the University of Pittsburgh participated in one of six
sessions. There were between 13 and 20 participants in each session. The experiment was
conducted as follows. Participants were seated in a large class room. They were given a folder
with a set of instructions, a quiz, an envelope, a calculator, and a pen. The instructions were
then read out loud, and the participants were given a brief quiz to make sure that they could
calculate the payo¤s of a sample decision. Having received answers to the quiz participants
proceeded to the decision task.
To help identify individual preferences the study was conducted as a within-subject
design. Participants were given a set of budgets for which the individuals endowment and
the childs xed initial donation varied. For each budget the participant was told that she or
he was free to allocate any portion of the endowment to the child. The child would receive
the sum of the initial allocation and the contribution made by the participant.
Although the study was designed to be double-blind, participants had the option of
relinquishing their anonymity in the event that they wanted to receive a receipt from the Red
Cross. Each decision sheet was identied only by a Claim Check number, and this number
was used for the subjects anonymous payment. Once the decision task was completed
the participant placed the decision sheet in the envelope, and with the exception of the
participants who requested an acknowledgement forms, the decisions were from that point
onward only identied by a Claim Check number. While one set of experimenters prepared
the participantspayments in sealed envelopes, an experimenter who did not oversee the
payment was in charge of distributing the envelopes by Claim Check number.
A careful procedure was used to assure participants that the experimental procedures
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were followed.4 During the instruction phase we randomly selected one participant to be
the monitor. The monitors job was to oversee the procedures of the experiment. He or
she followed the experimenters throughout the study, oversaw that the payment procedures
were as described in the instructions and secured that for each child a check was issued to
the American Red Cross for the amount determined by sum of the participants donation
and the relevant initial contribution. At the end of the experiment the monitor made a
statement indicating whether the experimenters had followed the procedures described in
the instructions. Participants were then shown the acknowledgements and checks that were
to be sent to the American Red Cross. These were shown from a distance where no details
could be determined. Once the participants had received their payment and left the study,
the monitor walked with the experimenter to the nearest mailbox, and dropped the envelopes
with the checks in the mail box. The monitor then signed a statement to certify that all
procedures had been followed and the statement was subsequently posted in the economics
department at the University of Pittsburgh. Similarly a receipt from the American Red
Cross was subsequently posted.
During the decision task participants were presented with the six budgets shown in Table
4.1. For example, for budget 1 the participant is informed that the foundation paying for
the study has contributed $4 towards books for the child, and that the participant has been
given an endowment of $40 which must be allocated between him or herself and the child.
At the end of the decision task the monitor randomly selected a number between 1 and 6,
and the decision for the selected budget was carried out.
These six budgets allow us to test the comparative statics predicted by the alternative
motives for giving, and to determine whether the conditions that give rise to them hold. We
will focus on the following three tests.
Income E¤ect: We can determine the response to changes in income by comparing total
contributions on the budgets where the initial contributions to the child is held constant and
income increases (budget 1 vs. 5 and 3 vs. 6).
4The procedure is similar to that by Eckel et al. (2005).
68
Table 4.1: Experimental Budgets
Budget $ to child $ to self
1 4 40
2 10 40
3 28 40
4 34 40
5 4 46
6 28 46
Examining the e¤ect of an increase in income is crucial for determining the comparative
statistics of the motives for giving. While it is generally assumed that the impure altruism
model predicts incomplete crowd out, this prediction only holds under normality. Thus prior
to examining the comparative static predictions of the pure and impure altruism model we
need to determine whether the two goods are normal. Comparing total contributions to the
child between budget 1 and 5 and between 3 and 6 we determine whether the public and
private good are normal by seeing if the $6 increase in income increases total giving and the
amount of money the individual keeps for himself.
Balanced Budget Increases in Contributions: Comparing individual contributions between
budget 2 vs. 5 and 4 vs. 6 determines the e¤ect of balanced budget increases in contributions.
In moving from budget 5 to 2 we increase the initial contribution to the child by $6 while
decreasing the participants endowment by $6. Examining balanced budget increases in
contributions we can examine both the pure and impure altruism model. According to
the pure altruism model this balanced budget increase in giving should cause individual
contributions to decrease by $6. The reason is that the concern for the well-being of the
child is the sole motive for the pure altruist to give, thus the increase in initial contributions
will be viewed as a perfect substitute for private giving. Similarly a pure altruist is predicted
to decrease private giving by $6 when moving from budget 6 to 4.
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Provided that the two goods are normal the impure altruism model instead predicts that
contributions by others be an imperfect substitute for private giving. Thus an impure altruist
will not view a forced contribution to the child as equivalent to a voluntary one, and the
$6 balanced budget increase in contributions will result in less than a $6 decrease in private
contributions. For an impure altruist total contributions to the public good increase as a
result of budget balanced increases in giving, and the degree of crowd out will be incomplete.
Unfunded Increases in Initial Contributions: Comparing individual contributions between
budget 1 vs. 2 and 3 vs. 4 determines the e¤ect of unfunded increases in contributions.
Unfunded increases in initial giving enable us to test comparative statics of three di¤erent
motives of giving. First, a pure egoist or a pure warm-glow giver is someone for whom the
sole motive for giving is a concern for the amount he contributes (i.e., preferences are of the
form Ui(xi; gi)). Thus changing the initial contribution to the child should have no e¤ect on
the individuals contribution, and contributions should be the same for budgets 1 through 4.
Second, for a pure altruist unfunded increases in initial contributions should trigger a
response equivalent to that of an increase in income. Consider for example a pure altruist
who views contributions to the public good as a luxury good, this persons sensitivity to
increases in initial contributions will diminish as the initial contribution level increases.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates such a scenario. The consumption of the public good is measured
on the horizontal axis and the consumption of the private good on the vertical. Consider
rst the situation where the individuals endowment is w and the initial contribution to the
public good is G i. Since the individual can only add to this initial contribution he is free
to choose any budget along the kinked bold budget line in Figure 4.1. Given the budget line
and the individuals income expansion path we note that his preferred level of the public
good is at G. Thus his contribution to the public good equals gi = G G i. Now consider
the response to an unfunded increase of  in the initial contribution to the public good. This
increase expands the budget set as shown below, and as seen by the income expansion path
the individuals preferred contribution level increases to G. Thus the individual wants the
 increase in initial contributions to result in an increase in consumption of both the private
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and public good. To secure this outcome the individual reduces his contribution to o¤set
the increase in initial giving such that the increase in provision is limited to that from G to
G, as indicated by the dark line along the horizontal axis. Now consider instead the case
where the same  increase in initial contributions occurred at a higher initial contribution
level such as G
0
 i. When the public good is viewed as a luxury, the income expansion path
will be concave, and as seen in Figure 4.1, relative to our initial evaluation point the increase
in initial giving results in a larger increase in the participants desired total contribution
and a small increase in the consumption of the private good. Thus the change in private
contribution to an unfunded increase in giving will be smaller when the initial contribution
level is large. For a pure altruist who views the good as a luxury we should therefore see
diminished sensitivity to unfunded changes in initial contributions.
Xi
G-i G*G-i+D G**
*
G’-i G’-i+D G
W
Figure 4.1: Response to Unfunded Increase in Initial Contributions
If we instead consider the case where the public good is viewed as a necessity, then the
income expansion path will be convex and a pure altruist will exhibit increased sensitivity to
unfunded increases in initial contributions. Finally, when a pure altruist has homothetic pref-
erences the change in private giving in response to unfunded increases should be independent
of the evaluation point.
Considering the response for a pure altruist we may then ask what the predictions are for
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an impure altruists response to increases in initial contributions? In moving from budget
1 to 2 and from 3 to 4 the initial contribution to the child increases by $6, however given
that the point for evaluating the change also increases (from $4 to $28) the marginal motive
for giving may shift from a concern for the childs well being to a concern for the private
benet associated with giving. Thus as the initial contribution increases, donations by others
become a worse and worse substitute for individual giving, and this shift will all else equal
result in diminished sensitivity to changes in initial contributions, i.e., all else equal the
response to the $6 change in initial giving is predicted to be larger when comparing budget
1 to 2, than when comparing budget 3 to 4.
Combined the predicted response to unfunded increases in initial contributions is as
summarized in Table 4.2. While we are unable to predict the response for an impure altruist
who views the good as a necessity, it is clear that constant or diminished sensitivity will be
seen as strictly supportive of the impure altruism model. As for balanced budget increases
in contributions we will examine the response to changes in income to determine what the
relevant comparative statics should be.
Table 4.2: Predicted Response to Unfunded Increases in Initial Contributions
Pure Warm-glow Pure Altruism Impure Altruism
Luxury No response Diminished sensitivity Diminished sensitivity
Homothetic No response Constant sensitivity Diminished sensitivity
Necessity No response Increased sensitivity ?
4.4 RESULTS
In characterizing the results we start by examining whether the cause we selected motivated
participants to contribute. Across the six budgets there is substantial variation in giving
and we are fortunate to have only a few participants who consistently appeared truncated
in their choices. Only one of our participants stuck to a contribution of zero for every one
of the six budgets, and an additional seven participants had average contributions at or
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below $3. At the other extreme we have ve participants who gave their entire endowment
away for everyone of the six budgets, and an additional two participants who made average
contributions of $38 or more towards the child. Average individual giving across the six
budgets was $20.82 (std.err. 1.16), however as seen by the contribution distribution in
Figure 4.2 the individual variation was large.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Average Contributions across the Six Budgets
In our analysis of the data we rst determine the response to changes in income. Next we
examine the standard balanced budget crowd-out measure to determine the evidence in favor
of the pure versus the impure altruism model. We then proceed to the response to unfunded
increases in initial contributions to the child to determine how sensitive the response is to
the point of evaluation. Finally, to evaluate the weight attached to the private benet of
giving we estimate a representative Cobb Douglas utility function.
4.4.1 Income E¤ect
To determine the predictions of the impure altruism model we need to examine how partici-
pants respond to changes in income. Figure 4.3 demonstrates how the contribution distribu-
tion shifts to the right as income increases from $40 to $46 while holding the initial contribu-
tion xed at $4 (panel A) or $28 (panel B). Increasing income by $6 increases contributions
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by $2.39 at low initial giving ($4) and by $2.46 at high initial giving ($28). These increases
are both signicantly di¤erent from zero (p < 0:001) and smaller than $6 (p < 0:001), thus
participants on average respond as if the charity and their private consumption were normal
goods.5
Figure 4.3: Contribution Distributions Conditional on Participant Income
Individual responses also show evidence of the public good being normal. Of the 2x85
cases where we may observe changes in demand as a result of an increase in income, we only
nd a decrease in demand in 10 percent of the cases. Thus it is fair to argue that participants
respond to the public good as if it is a normal good.
4.4.2 Balanced Budget Crowd-out
Given normality we can use our balanced budget crowd-out test to determine whether the
contributions we observe are consistent with the impure versus impure altruism model. As
the studies before us we test for pure altruism by determining whether a forced contribu-
tion completely crowds out a voluntary one. In contrast to earlier studies however we do
not rely on just one measure of crowd-out. Rather our design makes it possible to measure
the response to a forced $6 contribution at two di¤erent contribution levels. In one case
5We are unable to reject the hypothesis that the response is the same at high and low initial contribution
levels (p = 0:87).
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initial giving increases from $4 to $10 and in the other from $28 to $34, with the partici-
pants endowment decreasing from $46 to $40 in both instances. Table 4.3 reports average
contributions for these four budgets as well as the associated degree of crowd-out.
Table 4.3: Balanced Budget Crowd-Outs
Initial Budget Actual (n=85) Non-truncated
giving Initial Endowment Contribution Crowd-out Contribution Crowd-out
Low 4 46 27.2 (1.26) 26.7 (1.16)
10 40 21.6 (1.13) -5.66 (0.51) 21.0 (0.99) -5.70 (0.57)
High 28 46 19.5 (1.38) 19.8 (1.22)
34 40 14.8 (1.25) -4.63 (0.47) 14.6 (1.06) -5.21 (0.43)
The crowd-out at low initial giving is astoundingly high. Although the actual decrease of
$5.66 is slightly lower than the predicted $6, we cannot reject that the decrease is consistent
with complete crowd-out (p = 0:51). Had we followed the procedures of previous studies
and only examined one crowd-out measure, this result would have led us to conclude that
on average participants appear to be purely altruistic. However we would have reached the
opposite conclusion if instead we had elicited the crowd-out at a higher initial contribution
level. At a high initial contribution level the crowd-out is 77 rather than 94 percent, and
we easily reject the hypothesis that the $4.63 decrease in giving equals the predicted $6
(p = 0:004). In testing if the crowd-out measures at high and low initial giving are the same
we get a p-value of 0.11.
While the decrease in crowd-out is inconsistent with the pure altruism model it is entirely
consistent with the impure altruism model, and it demonstrates that to identify the motives
for giving one needs to elicit multiple crowd-out measures. We do however need to use
some caution before readily accepting this decrease in crowd-out as evidence of impure
altruism. The reason is that when participantsdecisions are truncated the calculated crowd-
out measure may lead us to make incorrect inferences regarding the underlying preferences.
First, at the higher initial contribution level we are more likely to observe participants
contributing nothing, and this will bias our results in favor of the impure altruism model.
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For example, a pure altruist may decrease giving by $6 between the two low-contribution
budgets and opt for a zero contribution at both of the high-contribution budgets. Thus
consistent with the impure altruism model we will see a decrease in crowd-out ($6 to $0)
despite the participant being purely altruistic. Indeed contributions are more truncated at
higher initial giving. While 3 people opted to give nothing at (10,40), a total of 9 people gave
nothing at (34,40). If we calculate the degree of crowd-out for the participants who made
positive contributions at (10,40) and (34,40), respectively, these increase to -5.7 (n=82) for
low initial giving and -4.96 (n=76) for high initial giving. Second, we also need to account
for the bias that may arise from participants being truncated at the other extreme, i.e.,
participants who contributed their entire endowment. While the direction of the bias is less
obvious in this case, there is the possibility that the crowd-out will be exaggerated at low
initial contribution levels. Consider for example a pure warm-glow giver who contributes
his entire income at (4,46), while this individual is forced to decrease the contribution to
$40 at (10,40) the unconstrained crowd-out is likely to have been smaller. To account for
this truncation we eliminate participants who contributed their entire endowment at (10,40)
and (34,40), respectively.6 The last column of Table 4.3 reports crowd-outs that result when
eliminating participants who are truncated either at the top or the bottom. Although the
degree of crowd-out increases when eliminating truncated observations, increases in initial
giving continues to decrease the degree of crowd-out (from 95% to 87%), and as before we
can only reject that there is complete crowd-out in the latter case (p = 0:6 and p = 0:07).
However, when we only include the 69 participants who were not truncated at (10,40) nor
at (34,40) we cannot reject that the two crowd-out measures are the same (p = 0:40).
Further evidence for the decrease in crowd-out may be seen at the individual level. Table
4.4 reports the number of participants for whom the calculated crowd-out was positive, zero,
incomplete, complete, or greater than the forced increase in giving. While for low initial
giving the mode of participants responded to the forced $6 contribution by decreasing their
contribution by precisely $6, at a higher initial contribution level the mode is for participants
6The reason for eliminating participants who are constrained at this level is that an impure altruist may
have made an unconstrained contribution of say $45 at (4,46) however in not viewing the forced contribution
as a perfect substitute for their own contribution he may wish to contribute in excess of $40 at (10,40)
causing the resulting decision to be constrained and the measured degree of crowd-out smaller than it would
have been given an unconstrained choice set.
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to decrease the contribution by less than $6. Thus as demonstrated by the average crowd-out
measure, there is greater evidence of impure altruism at the larger initial contribution level.
Table 4.4: Participants by Degree of Crowd-out
Number of participants (n=69)
Change in giving Low initial giving ($4) High initial giving ($28)
Crowd in > 0 5 2
No change = 0 4 4
Crowd-out (0,-6) 18 30
= -6 24 15
< -6 18 18
Note however that a number of observations are inconsistent with the standard inter-
pretation of the impure altruism model. Specically a small number of participants respond
to the forced increase in giving by increasing their own contribution, and about a fth of
the participants decrease their contribution by more than the increase in the initial contri-
bution. While inconsistent with the standard interpretation of the impure altruism model,
this behavior may arise if an impure altruist views the public good as an inferior good.
Interestingly participants who exhibit excessive crowd out are much more likely to make
contribution decisions in $5 increments.7
4.4.3 Unfunded Increases in Initial Contributions
Although the evidence from the balanced budget increase in initial contributions demon-
strates a strong altruistic motive, the decrease in crowd-out at the high initial contribution
level suggests that impure altruism may be a better approximation of the participantsmo-
tives for giving. We therefore proceed by examining the response to unfunded increases
in initial contributions. We start by examining the evidence in favor of participants being
motivated solely by warm glow.
7Participants with excessive crowd out (greater than $6) on average make decisions that are divisible by
$5 on 3.5-4 budgets out of the 6. By comparison those with complete or incomplete crowd out on average
make decisions that are divisible by $5 on 2-2.5 of the 6 budgets.
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Pure Warm-Glow Giving
A pure warm-glow giver is predicted to make contribution decisions that only depend
on his income and not on the initial contribution to the child. Holding the participants
income xed at $40, Figure 4.4 demonstrates how the distribution of contributions changes
as the initial amount given to the child takes on the values $4, $10, $28 and $34. In contrast
to a pure warm-glow motive an increase in the initial amount given decreases that of the
participant shifting the distribution to the left.
Figure 4.4: Contribution Distributions Conditional on Initial Contribution
As the initial contribution to the child increases from $4 to $10 and then again from
$28 to $34, the average amount given by participants decreases from $24.8 to $21.6 and
then from $17.0 to $14.8, with every one of these decreases being signicant. Similarly when
holding income xed at $46 and increasing initial giving from $4 to $28 (budgets 5 and 6) the
contribution to the child decreases signicantly from $27.2 to $19.5. Thus we easily reject
that on average participants are solely motivated by the private benet from giving. Looking
at the individual patterns of contributions a total of 14 participants have contributions that
only depend on their endowment. As noted earlier one of these participants never gave
anything and ve consistently gave their entire endowment. At a minimum it therefore
appears reasonable to argue that the remaining eight behaved as if they only were concerned
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about the amount they contributed.8 The vast majority of participants can however not be
characterized as pure warm-glow givers and we continue by examining the evidence in favor
of pure versus impure altruism.
Pure versus Impure Altruism
As the initial contribution to the child increases an impure altruists marginal motive for
giving will shift from a concern for securing the public good to a concern for the warm-glow
from giving, that is it shifts from a concern for the public good, G, to the private contribution,
gi: Thus the impure altruism model pulls behavior in the direction of diminished sensitivity
to changes in initial contributions.
We study the sensitivity to unfunded changes in initial contributions by comparing the
budgets for which income is held xed at $40 and the initial contribution to the child increases
rst from $4 to $10 and then from $28 to $34. While the change in initial contributions is
$6 in both comparisons, the marginal motive for contributing may be changing between
these two levels. We rst examine the response at the aggregate level. The participants
contributions and the resulting changes in giving are reported in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Sensitivity to Changes in Initial Contributions
Initial Budget Actual (n=85) Non-truncated
giving Initial Endowment Contribution Crowd-out Contribution Crowd-out
Low 4 40 24.8 (1.10) 24.5 (1.00)
10 40 21.6 (1.13) -3.28 (0.44) 21.0 (0.99) -3.59 (0.48)
High 28 40 17.0 (1.27) 17.1 (1.15)
34 40 14.8 (1.25) -2.16 (0.39) 14.6 (1.06) -2.54 (0.44)
We nd that there is diminished sensitivity to initial giving, as the $6 increase in initial
contributions causes a greater decrease in private giving between $4 and $10 than between
$28 and $34. The $6 increase in initial giving results in a signicantly (p = 0.03) greater
decrease in contributions when the initial contribution is low (-3.28) rather than high (-2.16).
8The mean contribution for these eight participants was $22.45 (std. err. 3.64).
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As for our earlier analysis we eliminate the participants for whom the change in demand may
be truncated. Eliminating participants who for the (10,40) budget gave nothing or gave their
entire endowment reduces the sample to 76 participants and increases the change in giving
slightly, similarly the change in giving is greater and the sample drops (n= 70) when removing
truncated participants at (34,40). Looking at the 69 participants who were neither truncated
at (10, 40) nor at (34, 40) we continue to see a signicantly greater response in giving at low
than at high initial contribution levels (p = 0:04).
Although diminished sensitivity to initial contributions is consistent with the impure
altruism model, it need not be inconsistent with that of pure altruism. In particular a
pure altruist, who views the public good as a luxury, would behave in much the same way,
with total contributions increasing at an increasing rate with the initial contribution. To
distinguish between the predictions of the pure and impure altruism model we therefore need
to determine the income elasticity of demand. We calculate two measures of the income
elasticity of demand for total giving to the charity by returning to the four budgets where
income is increased from $40 to $46 and the initial contribution xed at either $4 or $28.9
Including all participants the average income elasticity of demand equals 0.65 (0.16) at initial
giving of $4 and 0.63 (0.10) at initial giving of $28. Although we are unable to reject that
these two measures are the same (p = 0:89), we can reject that they equal 1 (p < 0:04).
Thus on average participants do not respond to the public good as if it were a luxury. The
results are the same when we eliminate participants with truncated decisions. For the 69
non-truncated participants the income elasticity of demand is 0.53 (0.12) when the initial
contribution is $4 and 0.71 (0.12) when it is $28.
To further examine the sensitivity to initial contributions, we classify participants ac-
cording to their average income elasticity of demand. We see that the 18 participants who
on average view the public good as a luxury demonstrate diminished sensitivity to changes
in initial contributions. That is their response to changes in initial contributions is greater at
low initial contribution level than at high initial contributions. When the initial contribution
is $4 these participants respond to a $6 increase in initial contributions by reducing their
individual contribution by $1.89, however when the same $6 increase in contributions occurs
9Income elasticity of demand = % change in total giving / % change in social income.
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at an initial level of $28, then the decrease in individual giving is only $0.44. Thus when
the good is viewed as a luxury, participants demonstrate signicant diminished sensitivity to
changes in the initial contributions (p = 0:06). As shown earlier this result is consistent with
the predictions of both the pure and impure altruism model. In contrast the impure and pure
altruism model may generate di¤erent results for the 46 participants who view the public
good as a necessity. While the pure altruism model predicts that there be increased sensi-
tivity to changes in initial contributions, the impure altruism model may result in increased,
constant, or diminished sensitivity. As seen in Table 4.6, we do in fact nd that consistent
with the impure altruism model there is diminished sensitivity to initial contributions, and
we reject the hypothesis that there consistent with pure altruism is increased sensitivity to
changes in the initial contribution.
Table 4.6: Sensitivity to $6 Change in Initial Contribution
Income Change in initial contribution Change
N Elasticity Low initial ($4) High Initial ($28) in CO p-value
Luxury 18 1.49 -1.89 -0.44 1.45 0.06
Necessity 46 0.44 -3.76 -3.11 0.65 0.40
Our results suggest that the observed diminished sensitivity to initial contributions is
evidence of impure altruism, and combined with the decrease in crowd-out on balanced
budgets it seems reasonable to conclude that our participants are not only motivated by
altruism. It is however important to note that our data also suggest that altruism plays a
substantial role. To determine the relative weight attached to either motive we proceed by
estimating a representative utility function for our sample.
4.4.4 A Representative Cobb-Douglas Utility Function
To get a quantitative indication of the relative strengths of altruistic and warm glow motives
in the aggregate, we use the data to estimate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas specication
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of impure altruism:
U(x;G; gi) = (1    )lnx+ lnG+ lngi
where x is the consumption of the private good, G the total contribution to the public good,
gi the individuals contribution to the public good, and  and  are the parameter weights
on the altruistic and warm glow motives. The optimal contribution gi is given by:
gi =  G i + 1=2[(1  )G i + (+ )Zi +
p
[(1  )G i + (+ )Zi]2   4G iZi]
where G i is the initial contribution to the child, Zi  wi+G i is social income. Throughout
the paper we have shown that there is substantial heterogeneity in the individual contribution
decisions. To account for the possibility that random departures of giving from the Cobb-
Douglas specication are likely correlated within-subject we estimate the model using the
following random e¤ect specication.10
gib =  G ib+1=2[(1 )G ib+(+)Zb+
p
[(1  )G ib + (+ )Zb]2   4G ibZb]+ei+uib
Where the ei part of the additive error term is the individual random e¤ect, i = 1; :::; 85
indexes the individual subjects and b = 1; :::; 6 indexes the six budgets of own income and
initial contribution that each individual faces. To account for the participants who at one
budget or another hit a corner solution at gib = 0 or gib = wb, we estimate the model using
non-linear, random e¤ects Tobit.11
Consistent with our earlier ndings we see that the coe¢ cient on the warm-glow component
is signicantly greater than zero, however the coe¢ cient is relatively small. One way of
assessing the weight on warm glow is to examine the predicted individual contribution at a
particular budget and determine what fraction of total giving would be accounted for by the
warm-glow component. Consider for example budget (4,46), based on the 85 participants
10The rst-order condition is quadratic in g. This implies two solutions for the optimal gib, one solution
as shown in (2) and the other as in (2) but with a   replacing the + before the square root term.
Estimation based on the solution with the negative square root term moves toward nonsensical vales of b
and b and does not converge.
11We calculate the estimates of  and  using maximum likelihood, assuming that ui and eib are normally
distributed. To calculate the multivariate normal probabilities when gib = 0 we use STATAs maximum
simulated likelihood routines (Cappellari and Jenkins 2006), adapting Barslunds (2007) multivariate Tobit
program.
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Table 4.7: NLLS Random E¤ects Tobit Estimate of Representative Utility Function
n=85 participants
Coe¢ cient Std. err p-value
Alpha 0.595 0.024 0.00
Beta 0.021 0.009 0.02
the predicted contribution at this budget is $26.82. Actual contributions at this budget were
an average of $27.22 (std.err. 1.26). Note however that if at this budget we had instead set
 = 0 then a pure warm-glow giver would only contribute $0.95. Thus, using the Cobb-
Douglas specication the predicted net e¤ect of warm-glow at this budget is less than 5
percent of the individuals total contribution.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Economists have long been skeptical of the extreme predictions of the pure altruism model,
and we have enthusiastically embraced the impure altruism model. However to date we have
failed to carefully subject this model to a direct empirical test. Using experimental methods
we have developed a design that directly tests the comparative statics of the impure altruism
model and simultaneously improves upon previous tests of the pure altruism model. When
examining both the standard balanced budget crowd-out and the sensitivity to initial con-
tribution we nd behavior that is very much in line with that predicted by impure altruism.
In particular we nd diminished balanced budget crowd-out and diminished sensitivity to
increases in initial contributions to the charity. That being said the data also demonstrate
a substantial altruistic component. When estimating the weights attached to the altruistic
and warm-glow components of a representative utility function, we nd that quantitatively
the weight on warm-glow is very small and if one was forced to characterize the participants
as either altruistic or pure warm-glow givers, then the rst would be the better choice.
As in any study one needs to use caution when trying to extend the results to other
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domains. For example, there is no reason to believe that the preferences estimated here
extend to all types of charity. It may very well be that preferences for humanitarian causes
are more altruistic than for non-humanitarian ones. However in contrast to earlier studies
our results do demonstrate that there are causes for which economic man sacrices his hard-
earned money - not because he wants to feel good about his deeds - but rather because he
is concerned for the welfare of others.
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APPENDIX A
DISCUSSION OF CRITERION D1
In this appendix we rst describe two equilibria when the seller has a pessimistic ex ante
belief ( < e) and show that only Equilibrium A can survive if we impose more restrictions
on the sellers belief o¤ the equilibrium path. Then we give the formal denition of criterion
D1 and present the e¤ect of applying this criterion.
Equilibrium A: The seller always o¤ers p1 = p2 = l; All buyer types always accept pt
if pt  vt and reject pt if pt > vt; The seller always forms a belief less than the cuto¤ belief
.
l 1ph
all types accept
types with lv =1  reject
types with hv =1  accept
all types reject
The seller always offers lpppp == )0,()1,( 1212 .
Figure A.1: Equilibrium A
Equilibrium B: The seller o¤ers p1 = l + qF (h   l), p2 = h if p1  l + qF (h   l) is
rejected, p2 = l otherwise; Buyer types with v1 = l accept p1  l + qF (h   l) and reject
p1 > l + q
F (h   l); Buyer types with v1 = h accept p1  h and reject p1 > h; The seller
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forms a belief greater than the cuto¤ belief  after p1  l + qF (h   l) is rejected and a
belief less than the cuto¤ belief  otherwise.
1p)( lhql F -+d h
all types accept
types with lv =1  reject
types with hv =1  accept
all types reject
The seller always offers
lpppp == )0,()1,( 1212 .
lpp =)1,( 12
hpp =)0,( 12
Figure A.2: Equilibrium B
We have discussed Equilibrium A in Proposition 1.
In Equilibrium B, the buyer types with v1 = l are willing to accept p1 2 (l; l+ qF (h  l)]
and incur a loss in the rst period since the seller threatens to o¤er p2 = h if p1 is rejected.
In equilibrium, no type rejects p1 in this range, so the seller can assign any belief after p1 is
rejected, so p2 = h after rejection of p1 can be sustained as part of the equilibrium strategy.
Equilibrium B, however, is not very reasonable if we impose more restrictions on the
sellers belief o¤ the equilibrium path. Suppose the seller unexpectedly observes rejection of
p1 2 (l; l+qF (h l)] and tries to gure out which type is most likely to reject the o¤er. First
note that the buyer types with v1 = h gain a positive payo¤ in the rst period by accepting
p1 2 (l; l + qF (h   l)] and the lowest o¤er p2 = l after acceptance of p1, so the types with
v1 = h are strictly worse o¤ by rejecting p1. Second, the seller nds that if her response to
rejection makes type (G; l) better o¤ or indi¤erent from the equilibrium by deviation, then
type (F; l) is denitely better o¤ by deviation. Thus, type (F; l) is most likely to reject p1
among all the buyer types. If this is true, the seller should o¤er p2 = l instead of p2 = h
when p1 is rejected, and Equilibrium B is no longer sequentially rational.
Equilibrium A does not have this problem. In Equilibrium A, since the seller always o¤ers
p2 = l and the buyer always accepts p1  v1, no buyer type can be better o¤ by deviation.
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Thus, the criterion applied on Equilibrium B does not have any e¤ect on Equilibrium A.
Criterion D1 formalizes the idea discussed above. The intuition conveyed by criterion
D1 is as follows. Consider a xed equilibrium and the out-of-equilibrium action a1 in the
continuation game following any p1. If whenever buyer type 1 has an incentive to defect
from the equilibrium and send the out-of-equilibrium message a1, or is indi¤erent between
the equilibrium and defection, some other buyer type e1 is strictly better o¤ by defection,
then the sellers beliefs should assign zero probability to type 1 when the seller unexpectedly
observes the out-of-equilibrium action a1. Denition 3 formally denes criterion D1 in the
continuation game.
Denition 3 (Criterion D1 in the Continuation Game Following p1). Consider a xed
equilibrium on the continuation of p1, with action a1 2 f0; 1g reached with zero probability.
Suppose x(p1; 1) and x(p1; 0) is the sellers equilibrium strategy.
Step 1: Find the sets of all (mixed) responses  by the seller that would cause type 1 =
(d; v1) to defect from the equilibrium and to be indi¤erent. If a1 = 0 is the out-of-equilibrium
action, form the sets
D1  f : (v1   p1) + qdx(p1; 1)(h  l) < qd(h  l);  2 [0; 1]g;
D01  f : (v1   p1) + qdx(p1; 1)(h  l) = qd(h  l);  2 [0; 1]g:
If a1 = 1 is the out-of-equilibrium action, form the sets
D1  f : (v1   p1) + qd(h  l) > qdx(p1; 0)(h  l);  2 [0; 1]g;
D01  f : (v1   p1) + qd(h  l) = qdx(p1; 0)(h  l);  2 [0; 1]g:
Step 2: For a given out-of-equilibrium action a1, if for some type 1 there exists a second typee1 with D1 [D01 ( De1, then the combination (1; a1) may be pruned from the continuation
game following p1.
Step 3: Check whether the xed equilibrium is still sequentially rational given that the sellers
belief is restricted to the buyer types who survive from Step 2. If not, then the equilibrium
does not survive from D1.
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Given a PBE, if the corresponding equilibrium in all the continuation games survives
from D1, then we say that the PBE survives from D1.
Denition 4 (D1 Equilibrium). A PBE of the game survives from D1 if and only if the
equilibrium on the continuation of p1 survives from D1 for all p1 2 R.
The e¤ect of applying criterion D1 in our model is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 15. The following results hold for a PBE in the continuation game following p1:
(i) If p1 > l and all buyer types accept p1, the equilibrium in the continuation game can
not pass criterion D1;
(ii) If p1  l and all buyer types accept p1, the equilibrium in the continuation game
passes criterion D1;
(iii) If p1 < h and all buyer types reject p1, the equilibrium in the continuation game can
not pass criterion D1;
(iv) If p1  h and all buyer types reject p1, the equilibrium in the continuation game
passes criterion D1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) and x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1) in a PBE. Then l <
C(F; l) < C(G; l) < h < C(F; h) < C(G; h); 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) only if p1 2 [C(F; l); C(G; h)].
We will show that it reaches a contradiction for any p1 2 [C(F; l); C(G; h)].
If p1 2 [C(F; l); C(G; l)), then only type (F; l) rejects p1 and x(p1; 0) = 1  x(p1; 1).
If p1 2 (C(F; h); C(G; h)], then only type (G; h) accepts p1 and x(p1; 1) = 0  x(p1; 0).
If p1 2 (C(G; l); C(F; h)), then (p1; 0) = () <  < () = (p1; 1) and x(p1; 0) 
x(p1; 1).
Denote X 0 as the probability for type (G; l) to reject p1 = C(G; l) and Y 0 as the proba-
bility for type (F; h) to reject p1 = C(F; h).
If p1 = C(G; l),
(p1; 0) =
X 0(1  qG)
X 0(1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF ) < ()
and
(p1; 1) =
qG + (1 X 0)(1  qG)
qG + (1  )qF + (1 X 0)(1  qG) > ();
so x(p1; 0)  x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(F; h),
(p1; 0) =
(1  qG)
(1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF ) + (1  )Y 0qF < ()
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and
(p1; 1) =
qG
qG + (1  )(1  Y 0)qF > ();
so x(p1; 0)  x(p1; 1).
Therefore, every case is contradictory to x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1), and the seller o¤ers x(p1; 0) 
x(p1; 1) in a PBE if 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) and x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1))  2 [e; b].
Suppose 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1), x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1), and  2 (0; e) [ (b; 1). Then C(G; l) <
C(F; l) < l < C(G; h) < C(F; h) < h, and 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) only if p1 2 [C(G; l); C(F; h)].
We will show that it reaches a contradiction for any p1 2 [C(G; l); C(F; h)].
If p1 2 [C(G; l); C(F; l)), then only type (G; l) rejects p1 and x(p1; 0) = 0  x(p1; 1).
If p1 2 (C(G; h); C(F; h)], then only type (F; h) accepts p1 and x(p1; 1) = 1  x(p1; 0).
If p1 2 (C(F; l); C(G; h)) and  < e, then (p1; 1) = () <  and x(p1; 1) = 1 
x(p1; 0).
If p1 2 (C(F; l); C(G; h)) and  > b, then (p1; 0) = () >  and x(p1; 0) = 0 
x(p1; 1).
Denote X as the probability for type (F; l) to reject p1 = C(F; l) and Y as the probability
for type (G; h) to reject p1 = C(G; h).
If p1 = C(F; l),
(p1; 0) =
(1  qG)
(1  qG) + (1  )X(1  qF ) > ()
and
(p1; 1) =
qG
qG + (1  )qF + (1  )(1 X)(1  qF ) < ():
So (p1; 1) < () <  when  < e and x(p1; 1) = 1  x(p1; 0). (p1; 0) > () >  when
 > b and x(p1; 0) = 0  x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(G; h),
(p1; 0) =
Y qG + (1  qG)
Y qG + (1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF ) > ()
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and
(p1; 1) =
(1  Y )qG
(1  Y )qG + (1  )qF < ():
So (p1; 1) < () <  when  < e and x(p1; 1) = 1  x(p1; 0). (p1; 0) > () >  when
 > b and x(p1; 0) = 0  x(p1; 1).
Therefore, every case is contradictory to x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1).
(ii) It is directly derived from Lemma 3 and (i) of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. Step 1: It is the unique D1 equilibrium strategy for the buyer to
accept pt if and only if pt  vt.
Suppose x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). Then 	(p1; 0) = 1 by Lemma 4 given  < e. Since
x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1), C(F; h) = max
1
fC(1)g < h. By Lemma 15, a PBE cannot pass criterion
D1 if 	(p1; 0) = 1 and p1 < h. Therefore, p1  h and 	(p1; 0) = 1, i.e., all types reject
p1  h.
Suppose x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1). Then 	(p1; 1) = 1 by Lemma 4 given  < e. Since
x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1), C(F; l) = min
1
fC(1)g > l. By Lemma 15, a PBE cannot pass criterion
D1 if 	(p1; 1) = 1 and p1 > l. Therefore, p1  l and 	(p1; 1) = 1, i.e., all types accept
p1  l.
Suppose x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1). Then all buyer types accept p1 if and only if p1  v1,
otherwise the seller o¤ers p1 = v1    and no equilibrium exists.
Therefore, combining three cases above, it is the unique equilibrium strategy for the
buyer to accept p1 if and only if p1  v1.
Step 2: Given the buyers strategy, the seller o¤ers p1 = l or p1 = h, and always o¤ers
p2 = l on the equilibrium path. The respective payo¤s for the seller is:8<: (l) = l + l;(h) = h+ l:
Since  < e < , it is optimal to o¤er p1 = l.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Step 1: It is the unique D1 equilibrium strategy for the buyer to
accept pt if and only if pt  vt.
Suppose x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). Then 	(p1; 1) = 1 by Lemma 4 given  > b. Since
x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1), C(G; l) = min
1
fC(1)g < l. By Lemma 15, a PBE can pass criterion D1
if 	(p1; 1) = 1 and p1  l. Therefore, p1 < C(G; l) and 	(p1; 1) = 1, i.e., all types accept
p1 < C(G; l).
Suppose x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1). Then 	(p1; 0) = 1 by Lemma 4 given  > b. Since
x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1), C(G; h) = max
1
fC(1)g > h. By Lemma 15, a PBE can pass criterion D1
if 	(p1; 0) = 1 and p1  h. Therefore, p1 > C(G; h) and 	(p1; 0) = 1, i.e., all types reject
p1 > C(G; h).
Suppose x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1). Then all buyer types accept p1 if and only if p1  v1,
otherwise the seller o¤ers p1 = v1    and no equilibrium exists.
Therefore, combining three cases above, it is the unique equilibrium strategy for the
buyer to accept p1 if and only if p1  v1.
Step 2: Given the buyers strategy, the seller o¤ers p1 = l or p1 = h, and always o¤ers
p2 = h on the equilibrium path. The respective payo¤s for the seller is:8<: (l) = l + h;(h) = h+ h:
Since  > b > , it is optimal to o¤er p1 = h.
Proof of Lemma 7. Step 1: Suppose x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1). Then l < C(F; l) < C(G; l) <
h < C(F; h) < C(G; h). 	(p1; 1) = 0 or 1 given e <  < b by Lemma 4. Therefore, all
buyer types accept p1  C(F; l) when e <  < , and all types reject p1 > C(G; h) when
 <  < b. By Lemma 15, if all types accept p1 2 (l; C(F; l)], the equilibrium cannot pass
criterion D1. So all types accept p1  l when e <  <  and reject p1 > C(G; h) when
 <  < b, under the assumption of x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1).
Step 2: Suppose x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1). Then C(G; l) = C(F; l) = l < C(G; h) = C(F; h) =
h. Therefore, all buyer types accept p1 < l and all types reject p1 > h. At p1 = l or h, see
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footnote 8. For p1 2 (l; h), types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1 and types (F; h) and (G; h) accept
p1, so x(p1; 0) = 1 and x(p1; 1) = 0 for e <  < b, which leads to a contradiction.
Step 3: Suppose x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). Then C(G; l) < C(F; l) < l < C(G; h) < C(F; h) <
h.
If 	(p1; 1) 2 f0; 1g, then all buyer types reject p1 > C(F; h) when e <  <  and
accept p1 < C(G; l) when  <  < b. By Lemma 15, if all types reject p1 2 (C(F; h); h),
the equilibrium cannot pass criterion D1. So all buyer types reject p1 > h when e <  < 
and accept p1 < C(G; l) when  <  < b.
Now consider the case 	(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1). First consider pure strategy, i.e., suppose
x(p1; 0) = 1 and x(p1; 1) = 0. By the proof of Lemma 16, it is not possible for any p1
to separate a single type from other types. So pure strategy is possible to be adopted for
p1 2 (C(F; l); C(G; h)] = (p; ep]. Types (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, and types (F; h) and (G; h)
accept p1.
Next consider mixed strategy, i.e., 0 < x(p1; 0)   x(p1; 1) < 1. Then either x(p1; 0) = 1
and x(p1; 1) 2 (0; 1) or x(p1; 0) 2 (0; 1) and x(p1; 1) = 0, since the knife-edge condition
 =  is omitted. The former implies (p1; 0) <  and (p1; 1) = , and the latter
implies (p1; 0) =  and (p1; 1) > . Therefore, (p1; 1) =  when e <  < , and
(p1; 0) = 
 when  <  < b. From Lemma 16, it is not possible for type (G; l) or (F; h)
to randomize, otherwise the seller can at least sometimes separate type (G; l) or (F; h) from
other types. So only type (F; l) and (G; h) will play mixed strategy.
Case 1: When e <  < , type (F; l) randomizes to reject p1 with probability X, (G; l)
rejects p1, and (G; h) and (F; h) accept p1. Then
(p1; 1) =
qG
qG + (1  )qF + (1  )(1 X)(1  qF ) = 
.
Type (F; l) is indi¤erent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
l   p1 + qFx(p1; 1)(h  l) = qF (h  l).
So type (F; l) rejects p1 2 (p; l] with probability X = 1+ qF1 qF   q
G(1 )
(1 )(1 qF ) , and the seller
o¤ers x(p1; 1) = 1  l p1qF (h l) , x(p1; 0) = 1.
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Case 2: When  <  < b, type (F; l) randomizes to reject p1 with probability X,
(G; l) rejects p1, and (G; h) and (F; h) accept p1. Then
(p1; 0) =
(1  qG)
(1  qG) + (1  )X(1  qF ) = 
.
Type (F; l) is indi¤erent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
l   p1 = qFx(p1; 0)(h  l).
So type (F; l) rejects p1 2 (p; l] with probability X = (1 qG)(1 )(1 )(1 qF ) , and the seller o¤ers
x(p1; 0) =
l p1
qF (h l) and x(p1; 1) = 0.
Case 3: When e <  < , type (G; h) randomizes to reject p1 with probability Y ,
(F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, and (F; h) accepts p1. Then
(p1; 1) =
(1  Y )qG
(1  Y )qG + (1  )qF = 
.
Type (G; h) is indi¤erent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
h  p1 + qGx(p1; 1)(h  l) = qG(h  l).
So type (G; h) rejects p1 2 (ep; h] with probability Y  = 1   (1 )qF qG(1 ) , and the seller o¤ers
x(p1; 1) = 1  h p1qG(h l) and x(p1; 0) = 1.
Case 4: When  <  < b, type (G; h) randomizes to reject p1 with probability Y ,
(F; l) and (G; l) reject p1, and (F; h) accepts p1. Then
(p1; 0) =
Y qG + (1  qG)
Y qG + (1  qG) + (1  )(1  qF ) = 
.
Type (G; h) is indi¤erent from accepting and rejecting p1, then
h  p1 = qGx(p1; 0)(h  l).
So type (G; h) rejects p1 2 (ep; h] with probability Y  = (1 )(1 qF )qG(1 )   1 qGqG and the seller
o¤ers x(p1; 0) =
h p1
qG(h l) and x(p1; 1) = 0.
Lemma 7 comes from the combination of three steps.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Step 1: U2 > maxfU4;U5g for e <  < .
U4   U2
= (1  )qF l(qG   1) + qGl(qG   1)
+(1  )qFh(qF   qG) + [qGh+ (1  )qFh  l]
< 0
Each item on the right hand side of the equation is negative for e <  < .
By plugging Y  into the denition of U5, U5 = 1 1  q
Fh + l, which is decreasing in .
So
max
2(e;)(U5   U2)
<
1  e
1   q
Fh  l
=
h
qG + qF   l=h(l=h  q
G)(l=h  qF ) < 0.
Step 2: Assume all buyer types accept p1 2 [p; l], then p1 = l is the equilibrium price
given that U2 > maxfU4;U5g.
(i) For an arbitrary p1 2 [p; l], assume all buyer types accept p1 2 [p; p1], type (F; l) and
(G; l) reject p1 2 (p1; l], and type (F; h) and (G; h) accept p1 2 (p1; l]. Then p1 is the optimal
p1 given U1 > maxfU4; U5g.
(ii) Since U1 = p + l < maxfU4; U5g < U2 = l + l, there exists p0 2 (p; l) such that
u(p0) = p0 + l = maxfU4; U5g. For an arbitrary p1 2 [p0; l], assume all buyer types accept
p1 2 [p; p1], type (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1 2 (p1; l], and type (F; h) and (G; h) accept
p1 2 (p1; l]. Then p1 is the optimal p1 given u(p0) = maxfU4; U5g.
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) By the denition of U3, U4, and U5, they are the possibly highest
payo¤s when the buyer adopts any semi-separating equilibrium strategy. Since the lowest
payo¤ from a pooling o¤er, U1, is greater than maxfU3; U4; U5g, there is no semi-separating
equilibrium.
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(ii) For all p1 2 (p; l], the buyer can adopt two semi-separating equilibrium strategies: 1)
types with v1 = l reject p1 and types with v1 = h accept p1, or 2) types with v1 = h accept p1,
type (G; l) rejects p1 and type (F; l) randomizes. If the rst strategy is adopted at p1 2 (p; l],
the sellers payo¤ by o¤ering p1 is dominated by U4. If the second strategy is adopted, the
payo¤ is dominated by U3 < maxfU4; U5g. Suppose the buyer adopts either strategy, given
U1 < maxfU4; U5g, a semi-separating equilibrium exists and the path is unique, with p1 = ep
or p1 = h, depending on whether U4 or U5 is larger.
(iii) Dene U(p1; X) = [qG + (1   )qF + (1   )(1   qF )(1   X)]p1 + l, which is
increasing in p1. First suppose maxfU4; U5g < U1 < U3. By denition U(p;X) < U1 < U3.
Therefore, there exists p00 2 (p; l) such that U(p00; X) = U1. For any arbitrary p1 2 [p00; l],
assume the buyer uses the second strategy for p1  p00 and uses the rst strategy described
in part (ii) for p1 > p
00, then p1 2 [p00; l] is the optimal p1.
Then suppose U1 < maxfU4; U5g < U3. Since U(p;X) < U1 < U3, U(p;X) <
maxfU4; U5g < U3. Dene p00 2 (p; l) such that U(p00; X) = maxfU4; U5g. If for any
arbitrary p1 2 [p00; l], the buyer uses the second strategy described in part (ii) for p1  p00
and uses the rst strategy for p1 > p
00, then p1 2 [p00; l] is the optimal p1. If for any p1 2 (p; l],
the buyer uses the rst strategy, then p1 = ep or p1 = h is optimal, depending on whether U4
or U5 is larger.
Proof of Proposition 12. Step 1: The equilibrium in the two-period version of Hart and
Tiroles (1988) rental model is as follows. In period 2, both types accept p2 if and only if
p2  v2 and reject p2 otherwise. In the rst period, the l-type buyer accepts p1 if and only
if p1  l and reject p1 otherwise. If  < l=h, the h-type buyer accepts p1  h   (h   l)
and reject p1 > h   (h   l) in the rst period. If  > l=h, the h-type buyer accepts
p1  h   (h   l), randomizes to accept p1 2 (h   (h   l); h] with probability y = h l(h l) ,
and reject p1 > h in the rst period. Therefore, if  < l=h, the seller o¤ers p1 = p2 = l; if
l=h <  < hl+l(h l)
hl+h(h l) , the seller o¤ers p1 = h  (h  l), p2 = h if p1 is accepted, and p2 = l
if p1 is rejected; if  >
hl+l(h l)
hl+h(h l) , the seller o¤ers p1 = p2 = h. The corresponding revenues
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are as follows.
 =
8>>><>>>:
l + l,
[h  (h  l)] + h+ (1  )l = h+ l,
yh+ h = h
2 hl+h2 hl
h l
if  < l=h;
if l=h <  < hl+l(h l)
hl+h(h l) ;
if  > hl+l(h l)
hl+h(h l) .
This part of proof is available upon request.
Step 2: Compare the revenue in our model with that in Step 1, assuming that  =
qG + (1  )qF .
(i) For an optimistic seller ( > b), there is a unique equilibrium outcome as shown in
Proposition 2, and the sellers revenue in our model is
(qG + (1  )qF )h+ (qG + (1  )qF )h
= h+ h > yh+ h:
So the sellers revenue in our model is higher than in Hart and Tiroles (1988).
(ii) For a moderately optimistic seller ( <  < b), the corresponding  is greater than
l=h. Denote W1 = h + l and W2 =
h2 hl+h2 hl
h l . Then it su¢ ces to compare the
potential optimal revenues W1 and W2 in step 1 with the optimal revenue in our model. Our
proof consists of the following results.
Result 1: W1 > V2 for  <  < b.
W1   V2 = (h+ l)  fl + [qG + (1  )qF ]hg
= (h+ l)  (l + h) = (1  )(h  l) > 0
The inequality holds since  >  and  > l=h.
Result 2: W1 > V4.
W1   V4 = f[h  (h  l)] + h+ (1  )lg
 f[h  qG(h  l)] + [(qG)2 + (1  )(qF )2]h+ (1  )lg
= f  [(qG)2 + (1  )(qF )2]gh  (1  qG)(h  l)
= [qG(1  qG) + (1  )qF (1  qF )]h  (1  qG)(h  l)
= (1  qG)h+ (1  )qF (qG   qF )h  (1  qG)(h  l)
= (1  )qF (qG   qF )h+ (1  qG)l > 0:
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Result 3: V5 > W2 if (1  qF )(1  l=h) < qG   l=h.
V5  W2 = [qG(1  Y ) + (1  )qF ]h  yh
= (qG   qF )( 1  q
F
qG   l=h  
1
1  l=h)h+ [q
F   (1  q
F )(l=h  qF )
qG   l=h +
l=h  qF
1  l=h ]h
If (1  qF )(1  l=h) < qG   l=h, then V5 > W2 when
 <
l=h  qF
qG   qF  
qF
qG   qF
1
1 qF
qG l=h   11 l=h
:
The RHS of the inequality is decreasing in qG and converges to 1 when qG ! 1, therefore the
RHS of the inequality is greater than 1, so the inequality always holds when (1 qF )(1 l=h) <
qG   l=h.
Result 4: There exists  2 (; b) such that for  2 (; b)W2 > W1, if qG > (1 qF )(1 
l=h) + l=h and qF < (l=h)(1 l=h)
l=h+(1 l=h) .
W2 > W1 )  > l=h+ (l=h)(1  l=h)
l=h+ (1  l=h)
)  > 1
qG   qF [
l=h+ (l=h)(1  l=h)
l=h+ (1  l=h)   q
F ]  
It is easy to show that  >  = l=h q
F
qG qF . Next we need to show the conditions under which
 < b = 1 qF
(1 qF ) (qG l=h)  l=h q
F
qG qF .
qG   l=h > (1  qF )(1  l=h)
, (1  qF )  (qG   l=h) < (1  qF )  (1  qF )(1  l=h)
, (1  qF )(l=h) > (1  qF )  (qG   l=h)
, l=h  q
F
l=h
<
(1  qF )(l=h  qF )
(1  qF )  (qG   l=h)
To show  < b, it is su¢ cient to show that
l=h+ (l=h)(1  l=h)
l=h+ (1  l=h)   q
F <
l=h  qF
l=h
,
which is satised when qF < (l=h)(1 l=h)
l=h+(1 l=h) .
Combining Result 1, 2, 3, and 4, we have shown that, if qG > (1   qF )(1   l=h) + l=h
and qF < (l=h)(1 l=h)
l=h+(1 l=h) , there exists  2 (; b) such that for  2 (; b) V5 > W2 > W1 >
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maxfV2; V4g. Therefore, V5 is the optimal revenue in our model and it is higher than the
optimal revenue in the two-period version of Hart and Tirole (1988).
(iii) For a pessimistic seller or moderately pessimistic seller ( < ), there always exists
a pooling equilibrium in which the seller o¤ers p1 = p2 = l and all buyer types accept the
o¤er as shown in Proposition 1 and 3. This equilibrium yields revenue l + l, which is the
same as in Hart and Tiroles (1988).
Proof of Lemma 15. Part 1: Suppose 	(p1; 1) = 1 in the continuation game following p1 >
l. Then x(p1;1) > x(p1; 0) and x(p1;1) = 1 without considering the knife-edge case that
 = . Sincemaxfx(p1;1) x(p1; 0)g = 1 and all types accept p1, p1  min
(d;v1)
fv1+qd(h l)g =
l + qF (h  l) by the denition of cuto¤ value.
Apply Denition 1 in the case that a1 = 0 is the out-of-equilibrium message and form
the sets D1 and D
0
1
for each buyer type 1. So D1 = f :  > x(p1; 1)+ v1 p1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g
and D01 = f :  = x(p1; 1) + v1 p1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g. Therefore, for x(p1;1) = 1 and p1 2
(l; l + qF (h   l)], D1 [ D01 ( D(F;l) for all 1 6= (F; l). All the combinations (1; a1 = 0)
with 1 6= (F; l) are pruned from the game. Given the sellers belief is restricted on type (F; l)
after rejection, x(p1; 0) = 1 and it is contradictory to x(p1;1) > x(p1; 0). So the equilibrium
fails to pass criterion D1.
Part 2: Suppose 	(p1; 1) = 1 in the continuation game following p1  l. From Part 1,
D1 = f :  > x(p1; 1)+ v1 p1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g and D01 = f :  = x(p1; 1)+ v1 p1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g.
If p1 = l and  < , D1 [ D01 = ; for 1 2 f(F; h); (G; h)g and D1 [ D01 = f1g for
1 2 f(F; l); (G; l)g.
If p1 = l and  > , D1 [D01 = ; for 1 2 f(F; h); (G; h)g and D1 [D01 = [0; 1] for
1 2 f(F; l); (G; l)g.
If p1 < l and  < , then D1 [D01 = ; for all buyer types 1.
If p1 < l and  > , then eitherD1[D01 = ; for all buyer types 1 orD1[D01 ( D(G;l).
If the latter happens, the sellers belief is restricted on type (G; l) after rejection and she
o¤ers x(p1; 0) = 0. It is still sequential rational for all buyer types 1 to accept p1 < l given
x(p1; 1) = x(p1; 0) = 0.
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In all the cases above, the equilibrium passes criterion D1.
Part 3: Suppose 	(p1; 0) = 1 in the continuation game following p1 < h. Then
x(p1;0) > x(p1; 1) and x(p1;0) = 1 without considering the knife-edge case that  = . Since
maxfx(p1;0) x(p1; 1)g = 1 and all types reject p1, p1  max
(d;v1)
fv1 qd(h l)g = h qF (h l)
by the denition of cuto¤ value.
Apply Denition 1 in the case that a1 = 1 is the out-of-equilibrium message. So D1 =
f :  > x(p1; 0) + p1 v1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g and D01 = f :  = x(p1; 0) + p1 v1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g.
Then for x(p1;0) = 1 and p1 2 [h   qF (h   l); h), D1 [ D01 ( D(F;h) for all 1 6= (F; h).
All the combinations (1; a1 = 1) with 1 6= (F; h) are pruned from the game. Given the
sellers belief is restricted on type (F; h) after acceptance, x(p1;1) = 1 and it is contradictory
to x(p1;0) > x(p1; 1). So the equilibrium fails to pass Criterion D1.
Part 4: Suppose 	(p1; 0) = 1 in the continuation game following p1  h. From Part 3,
D1 = f :  > x(p1; 0)+ p1 v1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g and D01 = f :  = x(p1; 0)+ p1 v1qd(h l) ;  2 [0; 1]g.
If p1 = h and  < , D1 [ D01 = ; for 1 2 f(F; l); (G; l)g and D1 [ D01 = f1g for
1 2 f(F; h); (G; h)g.
If p1 = h and  > , D1 [ D01 = ; for 1 2 f(F; l); (G; l)g and D1 [ D01 = [0; 1] for
1 2 f(F; h); (G; h)g.
If p1 > h and  < , then D1 [D01 = ; for all buyer types 1.
If p1 > h and  > , then eitherD1[D01 = ; for all buyer types 1 orD1[D01 ( D(G;h).
If the latter case happens, the sellers belief is restricted on type (G; h) after acceptance and
x(p1; 1) = 0. Then it is still sequential rational for all buyer types 1 to reject p1 > h given
x(p1; 1) = x(p1; 0) = 0.
In all the cases above, the equilibrium passes criterion D1.
Lemma 16. If x(p1; 0) 6= x(p1; 1) and 	(p1; a1) > 0 for a given p1 in a PBE, the sellers
posterior belief (p1; a1) 6= 0 or 1.
Proof of Lemma 16. Step 1: Suppose x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). Then C(G; l) < C(F; l) < l <
C(G; h) < C(F; h) < h.
If p1 < C(G; l), all types accept p1, and (p1; 1) = .
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If p1 > C(F; h), all types reject p1, and (p1; 0) = .
If p1 2 (C(G; l); C(F; l)), only type (G; l) rejects p1 and x(p1; 0) = 0, so it contradicts
with x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(G; l), either all types accept p1 or x(p1; 0) = 0 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) >
x(p1; 1).
If p1 2 (C(G; h); C(F; h)), only type (F; h) accepts p1 and x(p1; 1) = 1, so it contradicts
with x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(F; h), either all types reject p1 or x(p1; 1) = 1 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) >
x(p1; 1).
If p1 2 (C(F; l); C(G; h)), both type (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1 and both type (F; h) and
(G; h) accept p1, and (p1; 0) = () and (p1; 1) = ().
If p1 = C(F; l) and B((F; l); p1) = 1, then x(p1; 0) = 0 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) >
x(p1; 1). If p1 = C(G; h) and B((G; h); p1) = 0, then x(p1; 1) = 1 and it contradicts with
x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1). So more than one buyer types who are from di¤erent distributions accept
or reject p1 = C(F; l) or p1 = C(G; h).
Therefore, in any case when x(p1; 0) > x(p1; 1) in a PBE, the sellers posterior belief
(p1; a1) 6= 0 or 1, if history (p1; a1) is reached with a positive probability in the continuation
game following p1.
Step 2: Suppose x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1). Then l < C(F; l) < C(G; l) < h < C(F; h) <
C(G; h).
If p1 < C(F; l), all types accept p1, and (p1; 1) = .
If p1 > C(G; h), all types reject p1, and (p1; 0) = .
If p1 2 (C(F; l); C(G; l)), only type (F; l) rejects p1 and x(p1; 0) = 1, so it contradicts
with x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(F; l), either all types accept p1 or x(p1; 0) = 1 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) <
x(p1; 1).
If p1 2 (C(F; h); C(G; h)), only type (G; h) accepts p1 and x(p1; 1) = 0, so it contradicts
with x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1).
If p1 = C(G; h), either all types reject p1 or x(p1; 1) = 0 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) <
x(p1; 1).
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If p1 2 (C(G; l); C(F; h)), both type (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1 and both type (F; h) and
(G; h) accept p1, and (p1; 0) = () and (p1; 1) = ().
If p1 = C(G; l) and B((G; l); p1) = 1, then x(p1; 0) = 1 and it contradicts with x(p1; 0) <
x(p1; 1). If p1 = C(F; h) and B((F; h); p1) = 0, then x(p1; 1) = 0 and it contradicts with
x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1). So more than one buyer types who are from di¤erent distributions accept
or reject p1 = C(G; l) or p1 = C(F; h).
Therefore, in any case when x(p1; 0) < x(p1; 1) in a PBE, the sellers posterior belief
(p1; a1) 6= 0 or 1, if history (p1; a1) is reached with a positive probability in the continuation
game following p1.
Lemma 17. If x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1) and 	(p1; a1) > 0 for a given p1 =2 fl; hg in a PBE, the
sellers posterior belief (p1; a1) 6= 0 or 1.
Proof of Lemma 17. Suppose x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1). Then C(F; l) = C(G; l) = l < C(F; h) =
C(G; h) = h.
If p1 < l, all types accept p1, and (p1; 1) = .
If p1 > h, all types reject p1, and (p1; 0) = .
If l < p1 < h, both type (F; l) and (G; l) reject p1 and both type (F; h) and (G; h) accept
p1, and (p1; 0) = () and (p1; 1) = ().
Therefore, in any case when x(p1; 0) = x(p1; 1) for p1 =2 fl; hg in a PBE, the sellers
posterior belief (p1; a1) 6= 0 or 1, if history (p1; a1) is reached with a positive probability in
the continuation game following p1.
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 3 (MIN_NO SESSIONS)
Overview
This is an experiment in decision-making. The department of economics has provided
funds for this research. During the course of this experiment, you will be called upon to make
a series of decisions. If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you
can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. We ask that you not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment.
Specics
The experiment is divided into a series of sequences. A sequence will consist of an
indenite number of rounds. At the beginning of each sequence, you will be randomly
assigned as a First Mover or a Second Mover. Your role will appear on your computer
screen and will not change during the sequence. At the beginning of each round you will be
randomly paired with another person who is assigned to the other role from your own. That
is, if you are a First Mover (Second Mover), in each period you will be randomly paired with
a Second Mover (First Mover) with all possible pairings being equally likely.
In each round, you and your paired player will play the game described in the following
graph. First, the First Mover chooses between A and B. If the First Mover chooses A, the
round is over. The First Mover receives 35 points and the Second Mover receives 0 points.
If the First Mover chooses B, then the Second Mover must make a choice between C and
D. If the Second Mover chooses C, then the First Mover receives 0 points and the Second
Mover receives 100 points. If the Second Mover chooses D, then the First Mover receives 45
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points and the Second Mover receives 55 points. Following the rst round of a sequence, the
First Mover will be told the decision that his/her paired Second Mover has made in the last
round, if that player was able to choose between C and D. The First Mover never knows the
identity of his/her paired Second Mover.
First Mover
B
DC
A
35
0
0
100
45
55
Second Mover
Figure C.1: Decisions and Earnings (in Points)
To complete your choice in each round, click on the decision button and then the OK
button. The Second Movers need to wait for the First Movers to make a choice between A
and B before making their own choice. Then the Second Mover will be told that the round
is over (if the First Mover chooses A), or will be asked to make a choice between C and D
(if the First Mover chooses B).
The computer program will record your choice and the choice made by the player paired
with you in this round. After all players have made their choices, the results of the round
will appear on your screen. You will be reminded of your own choice and will be shown the
choice of your match, as well as the payo¤ you have earned for the round. Record the results
of the round on your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate headings.
Immediately after you have received information on your choice and the choice of the
player with whom you are randomly paired for the round, a ten-sided die with numbers from
0 to 9 on the sides will be thrown by each of you, one by one, to determine whether the
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sequence will continue or not. The experimenter will announce loudly the result of each die
roll. If a number from 0 to 7 appears, the sequence will continue into next round. If an 8 or
9 appears, the sequence ends. Therefore, after each round there is 80% chance that you will
play another round and 20% chance that the sequence will end.
Suppose that a number less than 8 has appeared. Then you will play the same game
as in the previous round, but with an individual selected at random whose role is di¤erent
from yours. You record the outcome and your earnings for the round. Then another throw
is made with the same die to decide whether the sequence continues for another round.
If an 8 or 9 appears, the sequence ends. The experimenter will announce whether or not
a new sequence will be played. If a new sequence is to be played then you will be randomly
reassigned as a First Mover or a Second Mover. The new sequence will then be played as
described above.
If the experiment does not end within 2 hours, you will be invited to continue the
experiment in the next several days.
Earnings
Each point you earn is worth 0.5 cent ($0.005). Therefore, the more points you earn the
more money you earn. You will be paid your earnings from all the rounds in cash, and in
private, at the end of todays experiment as well as $5 show-up fee.
Final Comments
First, do not discuss your decisions or your results with anyone at any time during the
experiment.
Second, your ID# is private. Do not reveal it to anyone.
Third, since there is 80% chance that at the end of a round the sequence will continue,
you can expect, on average, to play 5 rounds in a given sequence. However, since the stopping
decision is made randomly, some sequences may be much longer than 5 rounds and others
may be much shorter.
Fourth, your role as a First Mover or a Second Mover will be randomly assigned when a
new sequence begins. Your role will not change for the duration of that sequence.
Finally, remember that after each round of a sequence you will be matched randomly
with a player whose role is di¤erent from yours. Therefore, the probability of you being
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matched with the same individual in two consecutive rounds of a game is 1/3 since there are
3 First Movers and 3 Second Movers in the room.
Questions?
Now is the time for questions. Does anyone have any questions?
Quiz
If there are no more questions, please nish the quiz. Your answers to this quiz will
not a¤ect your earnings. The purpose of the quiz is to help you understand the instruction
better. After everyone has completed the quiz the answers will be reviewed.
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APPENDIX D
FREQUENCIES EXCLUDING FIRST ROUNDS
Table D.1: Frequency of Invest
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.500 0.867 0.978
No_Info_Cost2 0.639 0.839 0.782
No_Info_Cost3 0.642 0.833 0.841
Info_No_Cost1 0.863 0.627 0.907
Info_No_Cost2 0.790 0.094 0.296
Info_No_Cost3 0.778 0.417 0.432
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Table D.2: Frequency of Return-given-Invest
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.815 0.974 0.989
No_Info_Cost2 0.696 0.877 0.794
No_Info_Cost3 0.654 0.933 0.879
Info_No_Cost1 0.980 0.734 1.000
Info_No_Cost2 0.906 0.455 0.750
Info_No_Cost3 0.889 0.433 0.600
Table D.3: Frequency of Invest&Return
1st treatment 2nd treatment 3rd treatment
No_Info_Cost1 0.407 0.844 0.968
No_Info_Cost2 0.444 0.736 0.621
No_Info_Cost3 0.420 0.778 0.739
Info_No_Cost1 0.846 0.461 0.907
Info_No_Cost2 0.716 0.043 0.222
Info_No_Cost3 0.691 0.181 0.259
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APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 4
Claim Check____________
Welcome
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study on decision making. There are two
parts of the study today. In the rst part you are asked to make six decisions and in the
second part you are asked to ll out a survey. When you have completed your decisions we
will randomly select one of your six decisions for payment. Your total payment from the
study will be the sum of the payment that results from your decision and $5 for showing up
to the study. The entire study should take about an hour, and at the end you will be paid
privately and in cash. A research foundation has provided the funds for this study.
We ask that you do not speak to each other or make comments, except to ask questions
about the procedures of the study. We also ask that you do not discuss the procedures of
the study with others outside this room.
Your Identity
Your identity is secret. You will never be asked to reveal it to anyone during the course
of the study. Your name will never be associated with your decisions or with your answers
on the survey. Neither the assistants nor the other participants will be able to link you to
any of the decisions you make. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal
your choices to any other participant.
Claim Check
Attached to the top of this page is a yellow piece of paper with a number on it. This
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is your Claim Check. Each participant has a di¤erent number. We use claim checks to
maintain secrecy about your decisions, payment, and identity. You will present your Claim
Check to an assistant at the end of the study to receive your cash payment.
Please remove your claim check now, and put it in a safe place.
Decision Tasks
For the decision tasks you will be paired with a child in Southwestern Pennsylvania
(Allegheny, Washington, Greene, and Fayette Counties). The child is between 1 and 12
years old, and the childs family home has su¤ered extensive re damage. Most or all of the
familys possessions have been lost. For each of your decisions you will be given an amount
of money which you will be asked to allocate between the child and yourself. The money
allocated towards the child will be spent on childrens books. These books will be distributed
to the child by the American Red Cross of Southwestern Pennsylvania, immediately after
the child has been a¤ected by a severe re.
As soon as a re is reported in Southwestern Pennsylvania, the American Red Cross
is contacted and volunteers are dispatched to the site. They help the a¤ected families
nd temporary shelter, provide them with clothing, a meal, and give them a comfort bag
with essential toiletries. Each day an average of one family in Southwestern Pennsylvania
experiences a severe re. These families depend on the American Red Cross for emergency
help to cope with the sudden loss of their home and belongings. Unfortunately the American
Red Cross only has funds to provide these families with the bare essentials, and they do not
provide any comfortitems for the children of the a¤ected families.
For the study today we have joined the American Red Cross of Southwestern PA to
collect funds to buy books for the a¤ected children. In each of the six decisions you will be
given an amount of money which you are asked to allocate between the child you are paired
with and yourself. In addition the foundation has agreed to donate a xed amount of money
towards the child independent of your allocation. Thus the total amount to be spent on
the child is the sum of the foundations xed donation and the allocation you make to the
child. The amount of money that you can allocate between the child and you, as well as the
foundations xed donation to the child, will vary across the six decisions.
The American Red Cross will use the funds collected from your allocation and that of
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the foundation to purchase the child books. Each participant in this study is paired with a
di¤erent child. If you choose not to allocate any funds to the child, then the money to be
spent on the child will be limited to the research foundations xed donation. Only you have
the opportunity to allocate additional funds to the child. Neither the American Red Cross
nor any other donors provide books to the child. Your decision alone determines how much
will be spent on the child.
In explaining why the American Red Cross is seeking funds for books, their Emergency
Preparedness Coordinator Sandi Wraith states Childrens needs are often overlooked in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster because everyone is concerned primarily with putting the
re out, reaching safety, and nding shelter, food and clothing...just the basics of life. So
many times, Ive seen children just sitting on the curb with no one to talk to about whats
happening...for this reason Ive found trauma recovery experts in the community to work
with us to train our volunteer responders in how to address childrens needs at the scene of
a disaster.......being able to give the children fun and distracting books will provide a great
bridge for our volunteers to connect with kids and get them talking about what theyve
experienced.
Once we are ready to proceed to the decisions, you will be given a decision folder and a
calculator. The folder contains a decision task with six decisions on it, and an envelope. For
each decision you will have to enter your preferred allocation. If you wish to receive a receipt
from the American Red Cross for your allocation to the child, you will need to ll out the
acknowledgment form. Note however that by doing so you will relinquish your anonymity.
If you wish to remain anonymous, leave the acknowledgment form blank. When you have
completed the decision form please place it in the envelope along with the acknowledgment
form, instructions and the calculator.
When we have collected all the envelopes we will draw a number between 1 and 6 to
determine which one of the decisions counts for payment. Since one decision is randomly
selected for payment, you should be making your decision as if every decision counts.
Sample Decisions
Here is an example of the type of decision you will have to make. This is just an example
to demonstrate how everything is calculated. The example is not meant to guide your
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decision in any way. On the actual decision sheets we want you to select the allocation that
you like best.
Example: You have been given $20 to allocate between the child and yourself. The
research foundations xed donation towards the child is $5. You must choose how much
money to allocate towards the child and yourself.
You may choose to allocate nothing towards the childs books and $20 to yourself. If this
decision is selected for payment the foundations xed donation of $5 is spent on the child
and your payment from the decision will be $20.
Alternatively you may choose to allocate $20 towards the child and nothing to yourself.
The money to be spent on the childs books will be $20+$5 = $25, and your payment from
the decision is $0.
Finally, you may choose to allocate any amount between $0 and $20 to the child and
the remainder to yourself. Suppose you choose to allocate $8 towards the child and $12 to
yourself. If selected for payment the American Red Cross will receive $8+$5 = $13 to spend
on the childs books and your payment for the decision will be $12.
Monitor Role
To verify that all the procedures of this study are followed we will select a participant to
be the monitor of the study. If your Claim Check number is 8 you will be the monitor. The
monitor will follow the assistants around to see that everything takes place as explained in
these instructions. The monitor will receive a xed payment for his or her time.
Once all decision forms have been collected all participants will be given a survey. While
you are completing the survey the monitor will walk with two assistants to a separate room
to oversee that the calculation of the funds for the child and you are performed as described
in the instructions. Your payment will be placed along with a receipt in an envelope that
has your claim check number on the face of it. The assistant will make out a check to the
American Red Cross of Southwestern PA for the amount corresponding to the funds for the
child determined by your allocation. One check will be made out for each child. This check
as well as any relevant acknowledgment form will be placed in an addressed and stamped
envelope to the American Red Cross. Once all the calculations have been completed an
assistant will walk the monitor back to this room. A box of envelopes with your payments
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will be given to an assistant who has not seen your decision sheets. The monitor will then
make a statement to you on the extent to which the instructions were followed as described
in the instructions. Once you have completed your survey you may come to the front to
collect your payment by showing your claim check. An assistant who has not seen your
decision form will hand you the sealed envelope with your payment.
After the study is completed the monitor and an assistant will walk to the nearest
mailbox (on Forbes next to the Hillman Library) where the monitor will drop the envelope
in the mailbox. To prove that all procedures are followed the monitor will be asked to sign
a certicate to that e¤ect. This certicate will be posted outside 4916 Posvar Hall.
Upon receipt of the check and acknowledgment form the American Red Cross will send
a letter a¢ rming that the check has been used to buy books for the child according to the
description above. This letter will be posted outside 4916 Posvar Hall.
If you are the monitor of this study please identify yourself by coming to the front of the
room now.
If you have any questions about the procedures, please raise you hand now and one of
us will come to your seat to answer your question.
Before we proceed to the decision task we want you to complete a brief quiz, to make
sure you know how everything will be calculated.
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